A non-reductionist perspective on animals and humans

Abstract

Dit is relatief moeilik om die ooreenkomste en verskille tussen diere en mense te beoordeel binne ? konteks wat reeds vir ? geruimte tyd deur die neo-Darwinisme gedomineer word. Eerstens moet modale wette, wat betrekking het op ? onbeperkte klas van entiteite, van tipe wette onderskei word wat bloot op ? beperkte aantal entiteite van toepassing is. Waar diere, ten spyte daarvan dat hulle oor sensitief-psigiese eienskappe beskik wat by mense afwesig is, beperk is tot hul basiese fisiese, biotiese en sensitiewe behoeftes, erken die leer van diere-gedrag dat die mens tans as ? “kulturele wese” gesien moet word met ? eie “lewensgeskiedenis” en gereduseerde instinkte. Die beperkte sensitiewe intelligensie van diere word oorskry deur die mens se rasionele intelligensie. Rensch onderken ? diep gaping tussen dier en mens, gegee in die vermoë tot logiese denke. In die afwesigheid van begripskennis by diere is hul lewe instinkversekerd, soos gemanifesteer in erflike gedragspatrone [“angeborene Auslöse mechanismus” (AAM)]. Hierteenoor belig die sensitiewe openheid van mense die verdiepte en meer uitgebreide rol van gevoelens en emosies in die mens se lewe. Nogtans word geargumenteer dat die mens nie gekarakteriseer of gekwalifiseer kan word deur enige aspek nie – vervat in vermeende aanduidings soos homo sapiens, homo socuis, homo laborans, homo ludens, homo faber of homo symbolicus. ? Gedeelte van ? alternatiewe seining ontgin ? meer genuanseerde en gedifferensieerde verstaan van normatiwiteit wat die weg voorberei vir ? verduideliking van die seining van Dooyeweerd met betrekking tot die vier strukture wat in die menslike liggaam vervleg is – ? benadering wat afstand neem van die tradisionele dualisme van siel en liggaam. Terwyl die interne werkingsfeer van die fisiese, biotiese en sensitief-psigiese strukture in ? funderende sin behoue bly, is hulle in die menslike liggaam ingekapsel onder leiding van die normatiewe struktuur wat, hoewel dit kwalifiserend is, in sigself ongekwalifiseerd is. Aandag word ook aan die verhouding tussen tydelikheid, bo-tydelikheid en ewigheid gegee alvorens die ontleding besluit word met ? verantwoording van die onderskeie wyses waarop diere en mense in die normatiewe aspekte van die werklikheid funksioneer, met besondere verwysing na die aard van taal. Taal veronderstel verantwoordelike en vrye menslike handelinge wat op hul beurt toerekenbare keuses uit vele opsies verg – ? eienskap wat afwesig is by diere. Die ondersoeker van diere-gedrag, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, is oortuig dat dit wat, alternatiewelik, rakende diere, in die algemeen as ‘taal’ aangedui word, eksklusief binne die sfeer van interjeksie beweeg, van die uitdrukking van insiglose gemoedstemminge – en hy bevestig ook kategories dat die vermoë tot talige kommunikasie tipies menslik is en dat werklik niks vergelykbaar in die diereryk aangetref word nie.

Assessing similarities and differences between animals and human beings is fairly difficult in an academic culture dominated by neo-Darwinism for quite some time. First of all, modal laws, holding for whatever is functioning within the various aspects of reality, ought to be distinguished from type laws holding for a limited class of entities only. Whereas animals, in spite of possessing sensory capacities absent in humans, are restricted to their basic physical, biotic and sensory concerns in life, ethology does acknowledge that currently a human person is seen as a “cultural being” with a “life history” and reduced instincts. The restricted sensitive intelligence of animals is surpassed by human rational intelligence. Rensch discerns a deep gap between animals and humans, which is given in logical thinking. In the absence of any conceptual understanding animals are instinctively secured, manifest in inherited behavioural action patterns [“angeborene Auslöse mechanismus” (AAM)]. By contrast the sensitive openness of human beings highlights the deepened and expanded role of feelings and emotions within human life. Yet it is argued that the human person cannot be characterized or qualified merely with reference to one aspect only – such as homo sapiens, homo socuis, homo laborans, homo ludens, homo faber or homo symbolicus. Part of an alternative view explores a more nuanced and differentiated understanding of normativity, paving the way for explaining the view of Dooyeweerd in respect of the four structures intertwined within the human body – an approach taking distance from the traditional dualism between body and soul. While retaining their own inner sphere of operation, the physical, biotic and sensitive structures are, in a foundational sense, encapsulated within the human body under the guidance of the normative structure which, although qualifying, in itself is not qualified by any normative aspect. Attention is given to the relationship between temporality, supra-temporality and eternity before the analyses is concluded with a brief account of the distinct ways in which humans and animals function within the normative aspects of reality, with special reference to language. Language presupposes responsible and free human activities which requires accountable choices between multiple options, a quality absent amongst animals. The ethologist, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, holds that that “which, by contrast, regarding animals, is generally designated as ‘language’, exclusively moves within ... the domain of interjection, of the expression of moods lacking insight”, and he also categorically affirms that “the capacity of lingual communication is specifically human” and that “nothing really comparable is found in the realm of animals”.