How ‘individual’ are individual entities?

Authors

  • D. F. M. Strauss University of the Free State, South Africa

Abstract

Twee resente volumes van die versamelde werke van Dooyeweerd wat onlangs verskyn het is met ten minste een probleem gemoeid wat dwarsdeur die geskiedenis van die filosofie aangetref is, naamlik die probleem van individualiteit of van dit wat individueel is. Hierdie probleem is ten nouste verbonde aan die universaliteit van wette vir subjekte en van die ooreenstemmende wetmatigheid van sulke subjekte. Die eerste komplikasie is dat individualiteit steeds ? universele eienskap bly van elke individu. Alhoewel dit Dooyeweerd se bedoeling was om rekenskap van die wet vir individuele dinge te gee deur die uitdrukking individualiteitstruktuur in te voer, het hierdie nuwe term dubbelsinnig gebly. Aanvanklik het Dooyeweerd na die “individuele struktuur” verwys en somtyds het die element “struk tuur” geossilleer tussen wet vir en gestruktureer deur as betekenisonderskeidinge. Die idees van ? tipe-wet en ? identiteit struktuur kan verkieslik as alternatiewe uitdrukkings gebruik word. Die idee van ? tipe-wet is aanvullend tot die idee van modale wette en bevat geen essensialistiese aannames soos wat Stafleu en Klapwijk beweer nie. Hulle siening is beïnvloed deur die funk sionalistiese oriëntasie van die moderne natuurwetenskappe sedert die Renaissance. In hierdie artikel word ? vlugtige vergelyking getref tussen die sienings van Klapwijk en Darwin, waarin gefokus word op universele modale wette – modaal fisiese wette in die geval van Darwin en modaal biotiese wette in die geval van Klapwijk. Laasgenoemde spesifiseer bloot die universele sin van die modale aspekte. Dat die rasionalistiese tradisie sedert Descartes geen ruimte laat vir individualiteit nie word vlugtig toegelig, met verwysing na die weergawe van Frank en Haverkamp, terwyl ten besluite verwys is na hul romantiese waardering van wat individueel is.

Two recently published works of the Collected Works of Dooyeweerd share at least one problem found throughout the history of philosophy, namely the problem of individuality or of what is individual. This problem is intimately related to the universality of laws for subjects and the corresponding law-conformity of such subjects. The first com plication is that individuality remains a universal feature of everything individual. Although Dooyeweerd intended to account for the law which holds for individual things by introducing the expression individuality structure, this new term appeared to be ambiguous. Initially Dooyeweerd even referred to an “individual structure” and sometimes the element “structure” oscilates between law for and being constructed by as meaning nuances. The ideas of a type law and an identity-structure are preferable alternative expressions. The idea of a type-law is com plementary to the idea of modal laws but does not entail essentialistic assumptions as suggested by Stafleu and Klapwijk. Their view is influenced by the functionalist orientation of the modern natural sciences since the Renaissance. In this article a brief comparison between the views of Klapwijk and Darwin is given, focusing on universal modal laws – modal physical laws in the case of Darwin and modal physical and biotical laws in the case of Klapwijk. Both deny genuine biotical type-laws. The latter merely specify the universal meaning of modal aspects. That the rationalistic tradition since Descartes does not allow for individuality is briefly highlighted with reference to the account of Frank and Haverkamp and in conclusion their portrayal of the romantic appreciation of what is individual is mentioned.

Published

2011-12-16

How to Cite

Strauss, D. F. M. (2011). How ‘individual’ are individual entities?. Tydskrif Vir Christelike Wetenskap | Journal for Christian Scholarship, 47(3 - 4), 233-250. Retrieved from https://pubs.ufs.ac.za/index.php/tcw/article/view/271

Issue

Section

Artikels | Articles

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