
Educating on the basis of thin and thick value orientations

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Abstract

Some theorists about education in a multicultural society such as that of South Africa have been propounding the notion that public (state) education should be based on a minimum-universalistic human rights value system, or at most a system in which such values have been contextualized by local conditions and demands. This, they contend, is necessary for establishing a modus vivendi. This article expounds the view that education should rather rest on “thick” values, i.e. values filled with life view content. The difference between a pedagogical approach based on “thin” values (devoid of life view content) and one based on “thick” values is highlighted with reference to respectively life view and pedagogy related demands. Since an approach based on “thick” values could indeed lead to conflict, there should also be a place in education for the “thin” values that all can share.

Key concepts:

education, pedagogy, values, contextualized values, life view

1. Background and problem statement

Du Preez and Roux (2010:12) argue “that positive discipline in multicultural school environments partly relies on the infusion of human rights values that are neither solely universally nor particularistically interpreted”, and took issue with the particularistic stance assumed by Steyn and Wolhuter, and De Klerk and Rens “who argue that acceptance of certain Christian values could promote discipline in schools”. Du Preez and Roux base their objection to this stance among others on “arguments about the relativity of truths, not only between different religious beliefs, but also the varying interpretations and truths found in one religious denomination”. (...) “A value system that is based on only one particular religious or cultural view means that only one narrative is taken into account. That could jeopardise the realisation of the multicultural ideals of the democratic education system in South Africa” (Du Preez & Roux, 2010:14-15).

The question is, does a value system based on, for instance, only a bill of human rights not amount to the same stance as that to which Roux and Du Preez object, namely that “it is based on only one particular religious or cultural view”, meaning that “that only one narrative is taken into account”? A human rights narrative may also be prone to “varying interpretations and truths”. Attempts at avoiding controversial interpretations often result in “arid legalistic human rights scholasticism” (Blackburn, 2009:186). Du Preez and Roux (2010:23 *et seq.*) therefore rightly come to the conclusion that “It would ... be precarious to accept human rights values as univocal and not subjected to diverse interpretation”, and hope to find a way out of this dilemma by reverting to the views of Parekh (1999) because “his position may assist in pursuing values ... that are both contextually recognised and justified on a universal level” (Du Preez & Roux, 2010:24). Their hope draws attention to the matter of thick and thin pedagogical and/or value language.

Another issue complicates the matter further. As Du Preez and Roux (2010:19-22) discovered, the teacher-participants in their study tended to revert to their private and personal life and world view perspectives despite the exposure that they had had to a human rights culture in the schools. The participants showed an “intuitive preference from a particularist perspective”. In Du Preez and Roux’s (2010:22) opinion, “this position ... might lead to the selection of *a value system* (italics in original) that is based on one grand narrative to underpin disciplinary measures intended to be applied in a multicultural school environment”. Apart from the fact, as mentioned, that a value system based exclusively on (a particular version of) human rights theory is itself based on only one grand narrative, the implied view that learners and their educators should be discouraged from reverting to a grand

narrative rooted in their respective personal and social life and world views can be problematic.

Will a value orientation based on a human rights grand narrative indeed lead to better citizenship, greater social justice, greater tolerance and a better multicultural society than a value system based on (for instance) a particularistic Christian grand narrative, or will Parekh's stance of contextually recognising values that can be universally justified lead to the more successful achievement of these ideals? We may never find the final answer to this question, but we do know from the research of Du Preez and Roux (2010:19-22) and others (Scheepers & Van der Silk, 1998:679-691; Roux, 2003:131-132; Ferguson & Roux, 2004:15-16; Roux & Du Preez, 2005:279-280; Roux, 2006:1299-1300; Roux, 2006b:160) that educators on the ground tend to spontaneously revert to the convictions and assumptions imbedded in their personal life and world views (which does not mean that they are averse to interacting with adherents of different other faiths [Gilmour, 2000:231-232; Matsaung, 2003:81-82]). When actually engaging with younger people (including learners in public "secular" schools) for the purpose of guiding them to greater maturity, (Christian) educators tend to revert to the thick value language of their personal religions and life and world views. The question remains: could "thick pedagogical and value language" when actually engaging in pedagogical work with young(er) people lead to more effective education than education based on, for instance, a "thin" human rights value base?

2. Aim of this article

The rest of this article is devoted to a discussion of the problem of "thick versus thin values language" in education in an attempt to determine, by evaluating the views of various educators about "thick and thin" language in education, which approach is more likely to be more effective when actually educating, also in circumstances (schools) where different cultural and religious narratives interact.

3. Thick and thin values and pedagogical language

Parekh (2000:158) concludes that values formulated in universal terms are relatively thin, and that the embodiment or contextualising of such values in particular societies can be relatively thick. This view is consistent with Van den Beek's (2010:40 *et seq.*) that, while generally formulated metaphors at

first may seem the best because of their unspecific nature and their ability to provide grounds for consensus among individuals with widely different views and convictions, they prove to be too “thin”, i.e. devoid of life view content. Because of this, ethicists and philosophers have begun agitating for the use of “thick” language, language that can express the deeper content and sentiments imbedded in, and flowing from some or other philosophical, religious or life view tradition. In the case of moral or value education, at the ‘thin-public-minimal-narrow’ end of the continuum are those values which may be described as ‘legal’, while at the ‘thick-private-maximal-broad’ end of the spectrum are those values considered to be ‘personal’ standards left to the conscience of the individual (and can be narrowly religious or even pietistic in nature). In between these two poles are various configurations that vary from socially acceptable values to highly contested ones (Swartz, 2006:565-566).

Van den Beek (2010:41) furthermore explains why participants such as those in Du Preez and Roux’s study (2010) tend to revert to thick value language: it is only natural for people to do so; it is the way people are and talk; people do not live according to abstractions but according to the concrete contents of their religious faith and life conceptual convictions. “Thick” language usage is therefore truer to real life than “thin” language. It is an expression of ethical relativity which, as Naudé (2010:11) points out, embodies the notion that people hold different values that stem from their different cultures, religions, life and world views, adult examples, formal education and the media.

4. Two issues regarding thick and thin value language

The “thin and thick” value language tension brings two issues to the fore: the question of life orientation, and the demands of education.

4.1 Life and world view orientation

People in general, and educators (teachers and parents) in particular, can be broadly distinguished into two groups: those that are religiously orientated in a traditional sense, i.e. belonging to some or other (mainstream) religion or philosophical system such as Christianity, Islam or Judaism, and those who are more secularly inclined, in the sense of not recognising any attachment to a (mainstream) religion, church, synagogue, temple, shrine, dogma or faith (Mohler, 2008:29). The latter will arguably favour “thin language” with respect to life and world view and pedagogical values, or at most values that have been justified on a universal level as well as contextually recognised (i.e. the

intermediate position between particularism and universalism that Parekh (1999:130-131) propounded). Educators who prefer to pertinently base their pedagogical involvement with children on a religious grand narrative or a set of personal life view values tend to favour “thick” pedagogical value language. This can be demonstrated in the work of Christian educationists such as Van Brummelen (1994:26-45).

To take a practical example: for an educator with a secular orientation, the value “human dignity” would be important in the pedagogical situation because it is mentioned as one of the key values in, for instance, the South African Constitution (RSA: 1996: Section 10) as well as in the *Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy* (MoE, 2001). According to the “thin” wording of Section 10 of the Constitution, “everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected”. The dictionary explanation of “dignity” is also “thin”: it is derived from the Old French word *dignite* and from the Latin word *dignitas* derived from *dignus* meaning “worthy” (Stevenson & Waite, 2011:401). Legal explanations are somewhat “thicker”, in the sense that they give more meaning and depth to the concept, and contrive to explain why it has significance in human existence. According to Smit and Oosthuizen (2011:155), for instance, since the right to human dignity is inborn, it does not have to be earned. A synonym for human dignity is respect; in a democracy, even the lowliest criminal or beggar is worthy of respectful treatment. According to Currie and De Waal (2010:273), “... it is clear that the constitutional protection of dignity requires us to acknowledge the value and worth of all individuals as members of society. Human dignity is the source of a person’s innate rights to freedom and to physical integrity, from which a number of other rights flow.”

We find a detailed though still relatively “value thin” description of human dignity in Parekh (2000:146-148):

We ... rightly recognise the fact of human uniqueness and superiority and embody it in the practice of ‘human dignity’. ... Dignity is an aristocratic or hierarchical concept in the sense that it describes a status that only makes sense in relation to what is judged inferior. This is why every discussion of human dignity in one way or the other compares human beings with non-humans, and implies that they may not be treated as if they were animals or inanimate objects. ... Dignity is not an individual but a collective status, for the individual acquires it by virtue of possessing certain species-specific capacities and belonging to the human species. Human beings do not have dignity the way they have eyes and ears. It is a human *practice*, something they choose to confer on themselves and each other because of their mutual acknowledgement of their uniquely shared capacities.

We find yet another, slightly “thicker”, explanation of what human dignity entails in the aforementioned *Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy* (MoE, 2001:13-14) because of the South African Ministry of Education’s efforts to couch it in the African *Ubuntu* value system:

... there was a need in South Africa “for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation”. In the final Constitution [of the Republic of South Africa], the drafters applied the notion of ubuntu by asserting that the South African state was founded, before anything else, upon the value of “Human Dignity”. Ubuntu has a particularly important place in our value system for it derives specifically from African mores: “I am human because you are human.” Out of the values of ubuntu and human dignity flow the practices of compassion, kindness, altruism and respect which are at the very core of making schools places where the culture of teaching and the culture of learning thrive ...

Thin values such as respect for the dignity of the human being are universally sanctioned (refer *United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948) and, as Parekh (2000:150 *et seq.*) indicates, often contextually recognised in the school or classroom in which an educator in question teaches. However, as will be seen from a “thick” language description of this same value (human dignity) below, a thin value approach lacks at least two deeper perspectives, namely a transcendental view (i.e. a view about underlying principles, assumptions and presuppositions (refer Strauss, 2009: 46 *et seq.*; Coletto, 2009:294 *et seq.*) and a transcendent perspective (i.e. a “beyonding” view about what constitutes the religious authority on which a person bases his or her notion of human dignity (refer Ackerley, 2008:21). Even Parekh’s (2000:150 *et seq.*) five measures aimed at contextualising the value of human dignity leaves human dignity as a value relatively thin because he fails to assign rich content to it from a religious or life and world view perspective; he fails to explain from a religious or life view perspective precisely *on what transcendent (“beyonding”) grounds (i.e. why)* human beings possess dignity and why it should be respected by others.

An intentionally “thick language” (particularistic) view of the same value possesses both these attributes. This can be illustrated with a discussion of human dignity from a Biblical (Christian) point of view. (The same point can of course be made with reference to any other spiritual or life view orientation.)

According to the Christian view, human dignity is derived from the human being having been created in the image of God (Gen 1:26). Human beings are reflections of God’s glory (Life Application Study Bible (LASB), 1996:6). Some feel that reason, creativity, speech, or self-determination is the image of God. More likely, says the LASB, it is the human being’s entire self that

reflects the image of God. The human being will never be totally like God because He is the supreme Creator, but human beings do have the ability to reflect his character in their love, forgiveness, kindness and faithfulness. The LASB (1996:6) continues:

Knowing that we are made in God's image and thus share many of his characteristics provides a solid basis for self-worth. Human worth is not based on possessions, achievements, physical attractiveness, or public acclaim. Instead, it is based on being made in God's image.

The LASB echoes most of the ideas earlier expressed in Earle (1967:18), except for the fact that Earle also mentioned that having been created refers to the detail that God "formed the [human being] after the perfections of his own nature". God is the Fountain whence the human being issued, hence "the stream must resemble the spring which produced it". According to Earle, this means:

God is holy, just, wise, good and perfect; so must the soul be that sprang from Him: there could be in it nothing impure, unjust, ignorant, evil, low, base, mean, or vile. It was created in the image of God; and that image, St Paul tells us, consisted in "righteousness," "true holiness," and "knowledge" (Eph 4:24; Col 3:10).

It is clear, according to the Wycliffe Bible Commentary (Pfeiffer & Harrison, 1990:4), that the human being, as God made him was made distinctly different from the animals. He stood on a much higher plateau, for God created them to be immortal, and made them a special image of His own eternity. The human being was a creature with whom their Maker could visit and have fellowship and communion. The Lord could expect the human being to answer him and be responsible to him. Mankind was constituted to have the privilege of choice, even to the point of disobeying their Creator. They were to be God's responsible representatives on the earth, to work out their Creator's will and fulfil the divine purpose. The *New Bible Commentary* (Carson, France, Motyer & Wenham, 1994:60) expands on this last point with reference to Psalm 8: "rule" implies lordship, not exploitation. The human being, as God's representative, must rule his "subjects", as God does, for his own good.

The true worth of the human being, Boice (2006:91) contends, is that he is made in the image of God and therefore valuable to God and others. Moreover, he says, God feels for them, identifies with them in Christ, grieves for them, and even intervenes in history to make individual men and women into all that He has determined they should be. They are God's unique and valued companions.

It is clear from the exposition above that this Biblical “thick”/particularistic view of the concept and value of human dignity seems to be richer in content and meaning than the thin approach. Whereas the “thin” views of human dignity struggle to provide deep grounds for *why* human beings possess dignity, the thick Christian approach provides a transcendent rationale, namely that humans possess dignity because their having been created in the image of their Creator. This finding chimes with Ramcharan’s (2008:13-15) that mainstream religions and/or philosophical systems tend to assign deeper meaning to each human rights value.

4.2 The demands of education

It follows from the foregoing that if education (pedagogy) is the leading, guiding, equipping and enabling of a less mature person by a more mature person, such leading et cetera will be less meaningful and hence more superficial if based on a “thin” value orientation. Despite this, some educators and educationists prefer the “thin” approach (refer, for instance, Claassen, 2012:40-41), or at the very least Parekh’s approach of values that are contextually recognised as well as justified on a universal level, for the sake of avoiding conflict in multicultural schools and for promoting a *modus vivendi*. These authors seem to argue that conflict can erupt when “thick” values are applied; the more profound the religious and life conceptual content in value language, the more specific and exclusive it becomes, the greater the possibility of alienation of others holding different convictions. Because there is no final arbitrator or objective body that can say what is right and true, most educators prefer a thin value language approach (Van den Beek, 2010:42). In contrast, it seems that educators opting for the “thick” approach are less concerned about the avoidance of conflict in schools, about a *modus vivendi* or the ideals of a multicultural society than with the thick-value-based leading and guiding of the children entrusted to them towards the love for, and service of a greater Force or divine Power, who in the case of Christian educators is the triune God of the Bible.

This point can be illustrated with reference to the “thick” Christian approach to education. Tripp and Tripp (2008:11) refer to the stewardship approach to education as “shepherding the heart of the child”. Education should persuade the heart of the child of the wisdom and truth of the ways of the God of the Bible. The heart of the child should be guided towards delighting in God and the goodness of his ways. God’s Word, they say (Tripp & Tripp, 2008:19), teaches both educator and child to understand all human knowledge and experience in the light of his existence and his involvement in this world. The Christian educator’s objective when he or she teaches the child is not

simply to ensure that the child does not become a criminal, or “does well” in life. Rather, they say, “our desire is that (the child) should love the Lord with all his or her heart, soul and mind”. As parents, they insist, it is their “divinely appointed task” to commend God’s works to the next generation (Ps 145:4). The Christian educator sees the following words of God in Deuteronomy 32:46-47 in a serious light: “Take to heart all the words that I have solemnly declared to you this day, so that you may command your children to obey carefully all the words of this law ... They are not just idle words – *they are your life*” (emphasis Tripp & Tripp, 2008:19-20). To this they add: “The goal of formative instruction is so that we and our children and our grandchildren may fear the Lord and walk in his ways, enjoying a good life”.

According to the Christian approach, people have been given stewardship by God over their time, energy, talents, values, feelings, behaviour, money and all other things (Cloud & Townsend, 1992:73). Children and their upbringing are also deemed to have been entrusted to them by a personal God. Educators have to take loving care of what God has entrusted to them (in this case, the child and its education); they should feel themselves driven by inner motives such as religious considerations, and not out of a sense of duty. A steward in the service of God feels committed to the task and therefore experiences a deep sense of responsibility towards God as charge-giver. In a play on words, Lategan (2011:87) contends that “response-ability” embodies the notion that someone or something will not be used for personal gain, that the creation and maintenance of relations will be to the benefit of others and for the purpose of protecting them from harm. In the case of the nurturing or “shepherding” (Jones, 2006:145) of the heart of a child towards God, the purpose of the pedagogical interaction with the child is to guide the child to self-stewardship, to learn to lovingly care for a developing self, to have a sense of “mine” and “self” (Cloud & Townsend, 1992:73). Self-stewardship is synonymous with taking self-control. To educate is to help the educand to discover and reach his or her innate, God-given potential, in other words, to actualize the self. Alongside this is the ideal of self-driven development to become a servant of God, prepared to take up his or her calling in the kingdom of God, redeemed by his or her Saviour Jesus Christ and sustained in his or her efforts by the Holy Spirit of God. In this stewardship scenario, the educator is a facilitator assisting the educand to develop according to his or her own needs and vision of a future self in the service of God and his kingdom.

Stewardship in the context of education also consists of caring, loving, developing, nurturing, maintaining and protecting the child in all aspects of his or her personhood. Stewardship is aimed at improving the wellbeing

of the educand. Education also entails the enabling, guiding, equipping and discipling/disciplining of the educand (Van Dyk, 2003:155-158). The educand must be enabled to meet the requirements of her calling or tasks as future adult labouring in the kingdom of God. She must also be equipped with the necessary skills for that calling or task. As the etymology of the term “pedagogy” (derived from the Greek *agein*) suggests, education also entails the leading or guiding of the educand in a desired direction, in terms of a certain value system, a particular life view and even religious or spiritual commitment – in this case, the Christian value system, life view and religious/spiritual commitment. Discipling (i.e. helping the child become a follower of Jesus Christ)/disciplining, in turn, suggests that the educator should take the responsibility for guiding or leading the young person in a direction that the educator herself would find appropriate for her own life and future, namely as a steward fully committed to the service of the God of the Bible.

Spiritual, emotional and other forms of growth in the Christian religion are the results of good stewardship. We cannot value or treasure ourselves and what belongs to us if we had not been valued and treasured (Cloud & Townsend, 1992:281). Without such care, a person cannot shake a deep sense of being worthless (Cloud & Townsend, 1992:282, 291).

5. Synthesis

The value language used by the above authors in connection with the Biblical stewardship approach to education is clearly much “thicker”, richer in content and meaning than that used by educators and educationists concerned about education in multicultural schools for the purpose of promoting a *modus vivendi* and of pursuing the ideals of multiculturalism (refer Editorial *Christian Science Monitor*, 2005:8). Since this “thicker” value orientation is “deeper,” more meaningful than the “thin” or even than Parekh’s combined approach, the dangers of conflict, division, fundamentalism and even fanaticism may be lurking in their application, as Parekh (2000:154 *et seq.*) rightly warns. Educationists opting for thick pedagogical value language should therefore guard against these threats. It is helpful to know, as Ramcharan (2008:15) observed, that “the great religions and philosophical systems all emphasize the common humanity of every person”; they explain what “the common humanity of every person” means in the religious, philosophical or life conceptual language of educators actually engaging in the education of less mature people (students, learners, children).

As mentioned, educators seem to revert to the use of “thick” moral language for pedagogical reasons. They do this for an obvious reason, as Zecha (2007:57) contends:

The [names of values formulated in thin language] are all wonderful words which may certainly designate important attitudes or activities; however, they do not give a useful account of what a pupil is expected to do when he/she has acquired clarity, communication, loyalty, empathy, respect, etc. ... It is certainly important to explore with the students what these key words (value words) entail. ... A second task in values education is focusing on how the pupils should apply this knowledge in daily life, practice it continually, and thus acquire the ability to actualize values. ...

Nieuwenhuis (2010:15) concurs with Zecha: a value remains an empty ideal, unless we can infuse it with meaning by basing it on certain moral principles and empower people to take personal responsibility for doing it and applying it in their lives, for instance when dealing with other people.

Of course, the foregoing line of thinking does not deny a place for “thin” human rights value language in school classes (education) as well. People, and their values, are not so different that they cannot share enough ground to live peacefully together (Naudé, 2010:11). If any human being (in this case, learner) were asked whether he or she would like to enjoy respect for his or her dignity (or any other fundamental human right (i.e. thin value) such as to be free from arbitrary and summary execution, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced or involuntary disappearance, and persecution on grounds of religion or belief), there can be no doubt that s/he would answer in the affirmative. From this we may conclude that there is a basic (“thin”) set of fundamental human rights that all human beings would claim, affirm and defend (Ramcharan, 2008:61; refer Strietman, 2005). This is not sufficient, however; as indicated, truly meaningful education can only be based on content-rich (“thick”) values and pedagogical language (Van den Beek, 2010:42).

6. Conclusion

All educators and educationists tend to operate with a grand narrative, i.e. a communal and/or personally construed account of what education in essence is supposed to be and what it ideally should attain. This can be said not only of the pedagogies of adherents of recognised religions or systems of thought (hence operating with “thick” i.e. particularistic value-laden language) but

also those of secular orientation, such as those wishing to promote certain universal human rights values for the sake of the well-being of humankind and for the sake of *modus vivendi* in a multicultural society (hence preferring to operate with particularistic “thin” value language).

In the end, an educator’s choice is determined by his or her personal life view orientation. For one educator, the ideal of a *modus vivendi* in a multicultural society may be more compelling than any argument centring on the idea that a child has to be guided towards love and respect for a transcendent Deity or Force such as the God of the Bible. For his or her (mainstream) religious or philosophical system counterpart, such as a Christian, on the other hand, the command to be obedient to the calling and injunctions of God overrides all secular arguments.

In the final analysis, it seems that educators should, on the one hand, concentrate on helping learners understand the nature of human rights as a universal values system but, on the other, should go further than what Parekh suggested: they should teach values that are not only locally contextualised but that have intentionally been couched in the “thick” value language typical of a religious or life and world view stance. This is the only way to assign depth of significance to human rights values, and hence to education based on such values. This approach will not necessarily lead to conflict in classrooms but rather to a deeper understanding among learners of what makes each one of them different from all the others and thereby to respect for the human rights of all others.

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