

The Context and After-effects of the Organicistic Orientation of Early 19th Century Romanticism

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Samevatting

Die organisistiese oriëntasie van die vroeë 19de eeu is tipies holisties. Dit het ontwikkel in reaksie op die atomistiese denkwysse wat dominant was gedurende die 18de eeu, die Verligtingseeu. Met die oog daarop om te verstaan hoedanig alomvattende denkskemas toepassing vind, word probleme wat McIntire ten opsigte van die sin van die historiese aspek formuleer, gebruik om die belangrikke onderskeiding tussen begripkennis en begrips-transenderende kennis te verduidelik. In die laaste deel van die artikel word sommige argumente bespreek, wat deur Friesen na vore gebring is in sy poging om aan te toon dat prakties alle sistematiese onderskeiding in Dooyeweerd se denke teruggevoer kan word na die Romantiese denker, Franz von Baader.

1. Orientation

One of the prominent features of the intellectual movement known as Romanticism (late 18th and early 19th century) is its *organicism*, the fact that it sprung from a new appraisal of the nature of wholeness and totality while asserted the organic connection between things. This orientation ought to be understood as a reaction against the *atomistic* nature of the thought of the preceding 18th century known as the era of the *Enlightenment*. Although *holism* as a philosophical orientation proceeds from the idea of a whole (totality) preceding its parts – reflecting the original meaning of the spatial aspect where the parts-whole relation first appears (see Strauss, 2002) – the Romantic era transposed its holism into the context of organic phenomena.

This shift to organicism *preceded* the eventual development of Darwin's transformationist theory of evolution for it actually characterizes most of the thought of the 19th century. Even an individualistic thinker like Spencer remained faithful to the *organicistic horizon* of thought embracing the 19th century (see Spencer, 1968:22).

This romantic legacy also influenced the reformational movement in the Netherlands which – under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper – once again introduced the Christian world and life view as an all-encompassing perspective standing in radical opposition to that of modern Humanism and Roman Catholicism. Kuyper employed the idea of an *organism* in many ways and in his *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid* also applied it in the distinction he made between the church as an institute and the church as an *organism*. His characterization of the state as an *ethical organism* reveals ties with the classical legacy of Greek and Thomistic societal philosophy. This inheritance left its traces also in the first phase of the intellectual development of Dooyeweerd. During this initial phase (1922 - 1932) Dooyeweerd, without any hesitation, explored this mode of thought in his account of created reality. In order to understand the complexities involved in what ought to be seen as *basic* and *all-inclusive modes of expression* we may start by looking at the *twofold* way in which aspectual terms can be used.

2. What lies within and beyond the reach of understanding?

It should be realized that an important task of concept-formation within philosophy and the various disciplines is found in “tracking down” the modal aspect or reality in which particular (modal) terms are located (find their “original seat”). For example, the historian McIntire discusses the use of the term “development” (alongside terms such as “evolution” and “growth”) without realizing that its *modal seat* is found within the *biotical aspect* of reality (see McIntire, 1985a:97 ff.). Similarly, since *continuity* “resides” within the spatial mode, synonyms for continuity (such as *coherence*, *connectedness*, *uninterrupted*, *the whole and all its parts / divisibility*) are all located within this aspect.

The phrase “a modal term” designates any term finding its seat within some or other modal aspect of reality. Whenever a modal term is employed to refer to phenomena manifesting themselves within the boundaries of a specific aspect, one can say that such a term is employed in a *conceptual* way. The numeral “one” is employed in a conceptual way when the question: *how many moons does the earth have?* is answered by saying: *one*. This answer highlights the *modal function* of the moon *within* the quantitative aspect of reality. Similarly, determining the *size* or the *movement* of the moon requires the use of modal spatial and modal kinematical terms – all of them once again employed in a *conceptual sense*, because they merely designate what functions *within the boundaries* of (these) particular aspects.

Of course the (natural and social) entities we find within creation *transcend the limits* of any given aspect. This dimension of entities is distinct from that of modal functions precisely because the reality of no single entity is exhausted merely by one of its modal functions. Whenever modal terms are used to refer to realities transcending the limits of the aspect in which those modal terms have their seat, such terms are employed in a *concept-transcending way*. For the sake of brevity one can also speak about using such terms in an *idea-context*, or one can simply distinguish between *concepts* and *ideas*.

Asserting for example that God is *one*, employs a numerical term in order to refer to God – and God does not only transcend the numerical aspect but also creation as such. Similarly, distinct from the *conceptual use* of the biotical term “life” – for example when a plant is described as being “alive” – the Bible says “God is life.” Here a biotical term is employed in a way transcending the boundaries of the biotical aspect, i.e., it is used in an *idea-context*.

When the concrete “succession of events” occurring in reality is mentioned, as we have done above, we already implicitly used the numerical meaning of succession in an idea-context. Alternatively we can designate this process as a “genetic process” or as a “process of becoming.” In both cases we are using modal terms referring beyond their original modal seat to the said process. The term “genetic” has a biotical meaning and the term “becoming” is sometimes used in the basic physical meaning of “change,” and at other times in the biotical meaning of “growth.”

Let us look at terms residing in the historical aspect of reality. *Formative control*, surely is an appropriate designation of the *core meaning* of the historical modality. When it is applied in order to account for *tool-making* the phrase “formative control” is used in a *conceptual* sense. But when this notion of “to make” is employed in connection with the way in which God brought all of reality into being, our intuition of the meaning of the historical mode is stretched to the idea (concept-transcending notion) of “creation.”

Consider the following basic philosophical statements: *everything is unique, everything coheres with everything else, everything is constant and everything changes*. Although these four “idea-statements” clearly draw upon the core meaning of the first four modal aspects of reality (namely the numerical, spatial, kinematical and physical), the meaning attached to each one of them *transcends* the modal boundaries of the aspect upon which it rests.

As long as idea-statements like these are *balanced* by other equally legitimate idea-usages of (different) modal terms, and as long as they are utilized without *excluding* the equally legitimate use of other concept-transcending terms, then we know that we are not implicitly confronted with a one-sided approach that actually over-emphasizes merely *one domain* (or a limited number of modal domains) as the *source* of idea-statements. An atomistic approach in philosophy and the disciplines, for example, may be justified in employing *numerical* terms in an idea-context (such as asserting what we have stated above, namely that everything is unique and individual) – but as soon as it turns out that this is affirmed *at the cost of* other equally legitimate idea-usages of modal terms, then it dawns upon us that this orientation entails a one-sided *ismic* position. *Atomism (individualism)*, in fact, advances its emphasis on the uniqueness of whatever there is at the cost of acknowledging any genuine *whole (totality)* with its parts – it consistently wants to *eliminate* the idea of a *whole or totality*, thus *ruling out in advance* the meaning and legitimacy of those idea-usages that are possible in the employment of the terms *wholeness* and *totality*.

When the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition emphasizes the whole-parts relation in a *biologistic* sense, we observe an excessive use of the “organic” idea (idea in the technical sense of a modal term used in a concept-transcending manner). The *ism* manifested in this abuse is known as *holism* or *universalism*. It is this “abuse” of the term “organic” that is also found during the above-mentioned era of Romanticism – overarching the thought patterns of thinkers who, in other respects, may be adhering to entirely different views of reality.

The later 19th century witnessed another fundamental and significant transition, analogous to the rise of historicism at the beginning of the 19th century. Historicism transformed the conceptual rationalism of the Enlightenment into an irrationalistic historicism.¹ By the end of the 19th century the so-called linguistic turn and the eventual emergence of what became known as postmodernity mark a similar historically significant transition in the general pattern of philosophical thinking. Since this entire shift and its philosophical roots in the rise of modern nominalism have been analysed in a different context (see Strauss, 1994 and 1998), we now turn to a remarkable philosopher from the Romantic era that recently was

1 One may define *rationalism* as an absolutization of conceptual knowledge and *irrationalism*, by contrast, as an absolutization of concept-transcending knowledge (idea-knowledge).

rediscovered and currently receives renewed attention amongst philosophers, Franz von Baader. Recently, for example, a book of slightly less than 1 000 pages appeared explaining the philosophical stance of Von Baader, written by P. Koslowski, with the title: *Philosophien der Offenbarung. Antiker Gnostizismus, Franz von Baader, Schelling* (2003).

In many respects Von Baader works within a broader Christian tradition. His basic Christian convictions, on the level of the Christian world and life view, unite his endeavours with many Christian thinkers who preceded him and who came after him. Abraham Kuyper, for example, does refer to Von Baader in his works. However, also quite recently Glenn Friesen, published an article in which he alleges that Dooyeweerd's systematic philosophy is completely dependent upon and derived from the thought of Von Baader. He explained his argument in an article entitled: "The mystical Dooyeweerd. The relation of his thought to Franz von Baader," and it appeared in a Virtual Journal called: *Ars disputandi* [<http://www.arsdisputandi.org>; Volume 3 (2003)].

3. Dooyeweerd and Von Baader

The general picture of Von Baader's thought accounts for his concern about the issue of reason and faith and explicitly highlights his dependence upon the thought of philosophers such as Plotinus, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Eckhart, and Paracelsus and above all with Jakob Böhme and his follower Louis Claude St. Martin (1743 - 1804). In addition, his contemporaries, amongst them Fichte and particularly Schelling, exerted a traceable influence on his thought. He rejects a straightforward pantheism because he believes that although human thinking shares in the Divine wisdom it does not become an integral *part* of it. According to him philosophy differentiates in three subdivisions, namely (i) *logic* and *theology*, (ii) *nature philosophy*, and (iii) *philosophy of mind* (correlated with the "objects" God, nature and the human being). This kind of systematics is quite similar to the position defended by Kuyper in his *Encyclopedia*.

Yet, if one considers the emphasis Dooyeweerd always laid upon what he called the *integral* nature of the biblical creation motive, Von Baader in this respect holds a view that cannot be reconciled with such an integral (all-encompassing) creation perspective. According to Von Baader God first of all created the *immaterial world* – in which two forces operate; *desire* and *wisdom*, *matter* and *form*. The *materialization* of the world is an *effect* of the *fall into sin* (compare the remarks of Falkenberg, 1905:411). Bos also mentions the genesis of matter from the ideal world,

with reference to Kosłowski's account – where evil is conceived as a '*privatio*' of the good.²

Copleston points at a view of Von Baader that may be compared with the stance of reformational philosophy: "It was Baader's conviction that since the time of Francis Bacon and René Descartes philosophy had tended to become more and more divorced from religion, whereas true philosophy should have its foundations in faith" (1985a: 146). Yet this fairly *general* statement represents an element both of the Augustinian and the Thomistic tradition, as well as of the Calvinistic legacy, and therefore a further analysis of the *context* of this statement is needed – respectively in the thought of Von Baader and Dooyeweerd – if the aim is to show that Dooyeweerd derives this idea particularly from Von Baader. The way in which Copleston formulates the point rather gives the impression that the old problem of *reason* and *faith* is resolved by Von Baader by giving *primacy* to faith, whereas Dooyeweerd argued (eventually through his transcendental critique) that one should penetrate to the central root of both "faith" and "reason" without merely opting for the primacy of the one over the other, i.e. one ought to take into account the *depth dimension* of human existence where the *directional choice* between God or an idol is seated. It is therefore understandable that Dooyeweerd speaks in a very *articulate way* about the meaning of faith, making a clear distinction between the universal modal structure of the aspect of faith and its ultimate root:

The modal law-sphere of faith is often identified with religion, which is very detrimental to religious self-knowledge. Up to now we have always spoken of faith as of a modal meaning-function, viz. as the second terminal function of temporal human experience and temporal reality. As a subject-function faith is at the same time the terminal function of human existence in the transcendental direction of time. As such it is found in all human beings, in believers in Christ as well as in those whose faith reveals itself in an apostate direction. There is an apostate faith, and there is a faith which can only come into action in man through the Spirit of God. But both function within the modal structure of a law-sphere, implanted in human nature at creation. In both a sharp distinction must be made between the subjective function, the principium, the content, the direction and the root of belief. And in both cases it is obvious that the function of faith cannot be identified with the religious root of temporal existence or, in the

2 Review article of Kosłowski's Book, *Philosophia Reformata*, 2003:171, see page 172 where it is mentioned that according to Von Baader "man's coarse-material corporeality is a result of the Fall."

words of the Ecclesiastes, with the heart from which spring the issues of life. Believing, logical distinction, feeling, etc. are temporal functions delimited from one another in law-spheres of mutually irreducible meaning-modalities. But the religious root of our entire existence is not a function; religion is not enclosed in a temporal law sphere (Dooyeweerd, 1996-II:298).

These distinctions are not found in the thought of Von Baader. Copleston proceeds by referring to the speculative idea of God found in the thought of Von Baader:

In God himself we can distinguish higher and lower principles, and though the sensible world is to be regarded as a divine self-manifestation it none the less represents a fall. Again, just as in God there is the eternal victory of the higher principle over the lower, of light over darkness, so in man there should be a process of spiritualization whereby the world would return to God. It is evident that Baader and Schelling³ were kindred souls who drank from the same spiritual fountain (1985:146).

Von Baader's view of the "sensible world" therefore clearly *negates* the *integral* meaning of the biblical *creation motive* alluded to above.

3.1 State and Society

In the light of the fact that Dooyeweerd wrote an extensive series of articles dealing with the struggle for a Christian politics (to be published as Volume 6 of the B Series of the *Collected Works* of Dooyeweerd) and given the fact that Von Baader advocated – in opposition to the secular atheistic "power-State" – the ideal of the *Christian state*, one might have hoped that Dooyeweerd somewhere would have referred to Von Baader. Unfortunately such a reference is nowhere found in this series of articles. Nonetheless, one may discern some similarities: both Dooyeweerd and Von Baader reject the atomistic social contract theories of the Enlightenment. Von Baader also challenges the idea that the state is the ultimate sovereign power – God alone occupies this position.⁴ But what about the *limited* (i.e., non-ultimate) sovereignty (in terms of Groen van

3 F. Hofmann, the editor of the *Collected Works* of Von Baader repeatedly explains that Von Baader opposed the pantheism of Schelling. See Von Baader, 1853:285-286, footnote.

4 Copleston remarks: "In them he expresses a resolute opposition to the theory of the State as a result of a social compact or contract between individuals. On the contrary, the State is a natural institution in the sense that it is grounded in and proceeds from the nature of man: it is not the product of a convention. At the same time Baader strongly attacks the notion that the State is the ultimate sovereign power. The ultimate sovereign is God alone" (1985:146).

Prinsterer, Kuyper and Dooyeweerd: “sphere-sovereignty”)? Similar to traditional scholastic and reformed scholastic approaches Von Baader on the one hand calls upon the “moral law” and the penetration of society by *religion* and *morality*, and on the other still operates with the dominant *humanistic* view according to which *sovereignty* is either assigned to the *monarch* or the *people*. Copleston explains:

The ultimate sovereign is God alone, and reverence for God and the universal moral law, together with respect for the human person as the image of God, are the only real safeguards against tyranny. If these safeguards are neglected, tyranny and intolerance will result, no matter whether sovereignty is regarded as residing with the monarch or with the people. To the atheistic or secular power-State Baader opposes the ideal of the Christian State. The concentration of power which is characteristic of the secular or the atheistic national State and which leads to injustice at home and to war abroad can be overcome only if religion and morality penetrate the whole of human society (1985:146).

Talking about “religion” and “morality” *adjacent* to each other reflects the implicit traditional nature-grace *split* – where *religion* and *morality* belong to the higher “spiritual-ethical” domain – as opposed to the *secular domain* of *nature*. The authentic Roman Catholic position, according to which this spiritual-ethical domain ought to have the *guidance* in societal life, is captured in the slogan that grace does not cancel nature, but perfects it (*gratia natura non tollit, sed perficit*). Even Abraham Kuyper articulates this legacy within the context of his distinction between general and particular grace (where Christ is eliminated in the former sphere).⁵ In particular Kuyper holds that the (“side-ways”) influence of the congregation of Christ on “state and civil society” should result in a “moral triumph”, aimed at taking human life to a higher level, to enrich and purify it and to allow it to be disclosed in its fullness (Kuyper, 1931 - 1932 - II:249). Compare the traditional Roman Catholic view – in line with the thought of Thomas Aquinas – where the Roman Catholic church later on took the following position in the papal encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* (15 May 1931):

Surely the church does not only have the task to bring the human person merely to a transient and deficient happiness, for it must carry a person to eternal bliss (cf. Schnatz, 1973: 403).

5 Just compare Kuyper’s notion of the prayer to be used by municipalities where reference should be made only to God’s providence, that will allow “almost everyone to participate in the prayer” (Kuyper, 1917:285).

The differentiation between the sovereignty of the monarch as opposed to the sovereignty of the people used by Von Baader originates in the distinction Machiavelli made between *monarchies* and *republics*. Dooyeweerd rejects this entire distinction: by its very nature the state is a public legal institution, a *res publica* (see Dooyeweerd, 2003:162 - 163). Dooyeweerd's radically new theory of the state as a public legal institution (with its typical foundational and typical leading function) is absent in the quasi scholastic approach of Von Baader. The latter in fact found a starting-point for his political views in the thought of Edmund Burke (see Van der Ven, 1957: 1772).

This brief purview of some of the philosophical ideas of Von Baader certainly will not suggest an intrinsic link between him and Dooyeweerd. Yet Friesen is positive in his claim that practically *all* the systematic distinctions found in Dooyeweerd's philosophy are already present in the thought of Von Baader.⁶

A brief analysis of the upshot of his claims will now be given.⁷

3.2 Possible "candidates" for overlapping views

As an example we mention Von Baader's radical rejection of the attempt of "non-religious" philosophy to declare the human being, in abstraction from God, as *absolutely sovereign*. He says that the law of authority is not

6 Friesen believes that his analysis has demonstrated that the "following ideas of Dooyeweerd can all be found in Baader: (1) all philosophy is religious (2) the religious antithesis (3) the 'Wetsidee' (4) the dogma of the autonomy of thought (5) idolatry as the absolutization of the temporal (6) Ground Motives in history (7) the four types of Ground Motives (8) the three ideas within each Ground Motive (9) the method of antinomy (10) the use of Kant's ideas to criticize Kant's own *Critique of Pure Reason* (11) cosmic time (12) the supratemporal heart (13) the analogy of the prism (14) modalities (15) sphere sovereignty (16) sphere universality (17) analogies of time (18) anticipation and retrocipation (19) Man as the temporal root (20) Christ as the Second Root (21) the centrality of love (22) pre-theoretical experience (23) the Subject-Object relation (24) the *Gegenstand* relation (25) theoretical synthesis and (26) cultural development as an unfolding" (2003:1). [Since Friesen's article is available on the WEB any phrase quoted from his analysis could immediately be found with the normal search function of Word Processing packages.]

7 A more extensive treatment is found in an article submitted to *Philosophia Reformata* (destined to appear in the December edition, 2004 of this Journal).

8 "... so vermochten auch die Menschen nicht von selbst sich zur Gesellschaft zu constituieren, und nur ihre Gesellschaft mit Gott konnte und kann jene unter oder mit sich begründen; daher: omnis potestas a Deo. Daß das Gesetz der Autorität keine menschliche erfindung ist, beweiset the irreligiöse Philosophie zwar ohne ihr Wissen schon damit, daß sie diese Macht nicht mehr zu erklären vermag, so wie sie von Gott dabei abstrahirt und den Menschen absolut souverain deklariert" (Von Baader, 1865:5).

a *human discovery*, but finds its foundation in God.⁸ Taken on their *face-value* these views could have been articulated by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd or Vollenhoven. Yet, as soon as the *context* in which they appear are taken into account, a different picture emerges, for Von Baader believes that *authority* is *moral* in nature. From this moral nature he distinguishes *power* (Macht) in the sense of *physical force*. According to him the latter is merely an *aggregate* and not a proper concentration because in it the *moral principle* is lacking (cf. Von Baader, 1865:6). We have to note that the term “aggregate” reveals Von Baader’s reaction to the *atomistic* (*individualistic*) preoccupation of the *Aufklärung*. Furthermore, it must be understood in terms of his own “organic” preference that echoes the *holistic* (*universalistic*) mode of thought embracing the first half of the 19th century. We have pointed out above that is manifested itself foremost in the Romantic movement. Just consider his following statement:

Therefore without social, organic hierarchy, without power, authority and citizenship amongst them there cannot be a complete *organism*; ... (Author’s italicizing – DFMS; Von Baader, 1865: 5).⁹

3.3 *The misdirected arguments of Friesen*

In line with the non-integral perspective on creation found in the thought of Von Baader he associates the distinction between what is *organized* and *disorganization* with the *directional antithesis* between *good* and *evil* (sin) (Von Baader, 1865: 192). Different nuances of this view are found, for example where the contrary between love and hate is understood in terms of the opposition between *organic* and *inorganic*.¹⁰ This position also fits Von Baader’s identification of *antinomy* and *lack of wholeness* (“Widerspruch” and “Unganzheit” – Von Baader, 1921:203; on page 193 the inorganic is identified with the *hell*).

But, in stead of explaining the philosophical views of Von Baader as such any further, a brief glimpse will be given of the shortcomings in the argumentation of Friesen.

9 “Ohne sociale, organische hierarchie, ohne Macht, Autorität und Unterthänigkeit unter dieselbe besteht folglich kein vollständiger Organismus; ...” (Von Baader, 1865:5).

10 “Die Liebe ist das organische und organisirende, der haß das desorganisirende, anorganische Princip” (Von Baader, 1865:2).

4. Shortcomings in the argumentation of Friesen

Having quoted Dooyeweerd saying: *It is a matter of life and death for this young philosophy that Christian scholars in all fields of science seek to put it to work in their own specialty*, Friesen mentions a similar wording of Von Baader: *a war of life and death* – and then concludes that a “similar polemical spirit” is found in Von Baader and Dooyeweerd. Given their shared Christian convictions and their awareness of the struggle between Christianity and various non-Christian spiritual forces operative in their respective settings, this is not surprising. Yet, the real issue concerns the question whether or not the philosophical views of these two thinkers indeed converge as well. Friesen provides numerous references extracted by him from the works of Von Baader in order to show that this convergence indeed is a reality.

A first relatively minor issue is found where Friesen compares Dooyeweerd and Von Baader under the subheading “All philosophy is religious” (2003: 3). Dooyeweerd says that theory (and all the other issues of life) are in the direction-giving grip of some or other *religious* ground-motive – but he does not say that “all philosophy is religious”. Runner is best known for this statement (“life is religion”). The first quotation provided in this context actually highlights the distance between Dooyeweerd and Von Baader. Friesen says that Von Baader “speaks of the ‘religiosity of science, and the scientific character of religiosity’ (*Fermenta*, p. 207)” (2003: 3). It has been one of the major battles of reformational philosophy with theologians to deny that faith (“religion”) is scientific in character. Both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven view religion as the whole-hearted service of God – entailing that all walks of life are religiously determined – but it does not mean “life is religion.”

What follows are merely a few examples of the questionable way in which Friesen attempted to substantiate his thesis.

4.1 *Modal aspects and their interconnections*

Von Baader does not have a theory of modal aspects – in spite of all the non-supporting words of Von Baader collected by Friesen (such as “thought, word and art”). These terms refer to realities belonging to the dimension of individuality-structures. They are not modal aspects and in principle they function within all modal aspects of reality. The attempt to “show” that Von Baader already advanced the idea of modal analogies (retroceptions and anticipations) is completely unsuccessful. Once this kind of argumentation is followed one in fact can find “sphere universality” almost in any other thinker – such as in the idea of Leibniz

regarding the interconnectedness of “monads”. Ultimately, Von Baader simply sticks to his two root metaphors: *center-periphery* and the *organism* containing *cohering parts* – and in no single respect did Von Baader articulate what Dooyeweerd designated as *modal* sphere-sovereignty and *modal* sphere-universality.¹¹

4.2 Time and supratemporality

When Friesen says: “For Dooyeweerd, our supratemporal reality is not individual, but is the root of individualization” he draws a conclusion not supported by anything Dooyeweerd said. Dooyeweerd simply never said that “supratemporal reality is not individual, but is the root of individualization”. Apparently Friesen has confused the idea of individuality-structures with “individualization”. Von Baader actually observes something *negative* (something *egoistic*) in what he calls *individualization* and therefore opposes it to being re-united within the whole (Von Baader, 1921:171).

4.3 Pre-fall and the transcendence of time and space

Dooyeweerd never and nowhere defended the idea that the created human being (before the fall) was “above time and space”! These strangely mixed theological reflections of Von Baader are simply not to be found in Dooyeweerd’s thought.

4.4 The intermodal meaning of love

In Friesen’s exposition of what Von Baader says about love one does not read anything similar to what is actually developed in Dooyeweerd’s philosophical understanding. Dooyeweerd holds “that love is the central command of the law” and that “central love is love in its ‘religious fullness’.” Given the superficial verbal method of comparison employed by Friesen it is understandable that Friesen did not mention Dooyeweerd’s analysis of the intermodal meaning of love (see NC, II: 148 - 163) because it is obvious that Von Baader did not develop anything similar.

11 “Retrociprocity moments are therefore a kind of looking back to what has occurred. In contrast, the anticipatory moments look to what is yet to be unfolded in the temporal world.” This ascribes a genetic meaning to something understood in structural ontic terms by Dooyeweerd. The actual *disclosure* of anticipations (in the so-called opening-process) presupposes the ontic-structural “givenness” of modal aspects with their inherent (structural) sphere-universality.

4.5 *The traditional opposition of being and becoming*

There is a total absence of conceptual connections between Von Baader and Dooyeweerd where Friesen discusses pre-theoretical experience. In fact, it here turns out that Von Baader opposes “being” with “becoming” and identifies this opposition with the “Center” and the “periphery”!

4.6 *Epistemological confusions*

Friesen mentions that Von Baader distinguishes between “passive” and “active knowledge” – with the former we sink “into our Center” and with the latter we “fly past the Center”. He then proceeds to say: “The same distinction is made by Dooyeweerd; the *Gegenstand*-relation is a divergent direction of consciousness as opposed to the concentric direction of consciousness that is directed towards the Center (NC, I, 57, 58).” He does not mention that Dooyeweerd is here involved in discussing the third problem of his transcendental critique, namely the question how the concentric direction of thought, the direction of theoretical thought to the I-ness is possible (NC, I:52 ff.). Von Baader neither knows anything about Dooyeweerd’s theory of the *Gegenstand*-relation nor anything about the problem of the concentric direction of theoretical thought. But where Dooyeweerd speaks about “the direction of theoretical thought to the I-ness” Friesen simply replaces “I-ness” with the capitalized word: “Center” – a word with a speculative universalistic content in the thought of Von Baader. This substitution is another instance where Friesen has put words in the mouth of Dooyeweerd in order to support his artificial search for a supposed relation between the thought of Von Baader and Dooyeweerd. Later on a mere verbal similarity is once again employed – the use of the term *Gegenstand* in the sense of being “opposed to” – but it actually highlights the difference in stead of the similarity sought for by Friesen. Apparently Von Baader holds that *minerals*, *plants* and *animals* are placed on our (human) level by being “opposed” to us (in the “*Gegenstand*”-relation). Dooyeweerd’s basic conception of the *Gegenstand*-relation has modal aspects in mind and not concrete “objects” such as minerals, plants and animals.¹² Dooyeweerd does not say that “theory is an abstraction” as Friesen later on in his exposition asserts. At most Dooyeweerd speaks

12 That Dooyeweerd’s idea of the *Gegenstand*-relation actually derives from a Kantian and neo-Kantian source is argued in Strauss 1973 and 1984. Yet, without any foundation in anything Dooyeweerd said Friesen holds that “the *Gegenstand* relation ... [gives] ... rise to a belief in a split between soul and body”!

about “theoretical abstraction” (NC, I: 40). Furthermore, when Friesen says that this concerns “an isolation of a part of the coherence of reality” he loses sight of the fact that Dooyeweerd continues to emphasize that whenever an aspect “x” is “abstracted”, i.e., “is made into a ‘Gegenstand’ [it] continues to express its coherence (of meaning) with the modal aspects “y” (NC, I: 40). Since the term “isolation” entails cutting through this intermodal coherence, it is not an appropriate term to use in this context. Friesen did not realize that what Dooyeweerd calls the “objective analytical disstasis” (NC, II: 471 ff.) pertains to a *disclosure* of the logical object-side of reality and fundamentally contradicts Dooyeweerd’s own understanding of the Gegenstand-relation (as mentioned, already in the author’s Ph.D thesis he has subjected this issue to an extensive immanent criticism – see Strauss, 1973). The sentence “Theory is therefore a *disstasis*” *formulated* by John Friesen does not make sense. At most Dooyeweerd says that through the deepening of the logical object-side the modal aspects are distinctly objectified into an objective logical “standing apart” (dis-stasis). Theory itself is never “a disstasis” – merely the distinctly objectified modal aspects are standing apart.¹³

4.7 A human realm?

Within the context of discussing the subject-object relation Friesen explains ideas of Von Baader that do not reveal anything specific Dooyeweerdian. For that matter, already Aristotle advanced a view encompassing the realms of matter (*dunamei on*), plants, animals and human beings. However, an all-important point has to be raised. Dooyeweerd rejects the idea of a “human realm” because the human being is not qualified by any (normative) aspect – see NC, III: 87: “Why there does not exist a human radical type”. Although Friesen two paragraphs further down in his analysis mentions that “humans are not qualified by any aspect” he does not realize that this remark cancels the possibility to speak about a “human realm” – for he continues to use this expression! (In passing: Dooyeweerd never employed the term *enstasis* as an indication of what John Friesen calls our ‘standing-within our supratemporal center’ – see NC, II: 468 ff.)

13 Friesen explains that for Von Baader “[T]he word ‘abstraction’ means distortion, deformation, misstatement”. This beyond all doubt shows that Von Baader disqualifies *abstraction* as inherently **bad**, whereas Dooyeweerd considers it to be (fully accounting for its limited scope as) belonging to the *good* order of God’s creation.

4.8 Panentheism

In spite of the fact that the editor of Von Baader's *Collected Works* frequently adds extensive footnotes to explain that Von Baader is not a *pantheistic* thinker (see for example the extensive footnote in Von Baader, 1851:528), Von Baader does get very close to be panentheistic – for example where he says “that *Inexistenz* is a synonym of the immanence of all things in God.”

4.9 The intentionality of the Gegenstand-relation

John Friesen attempts to explain Dooyeweerd's view regarding the *intentional* nature of the Gegenstand-relation by saying: “In our theory, we must actively and freely [intentionally] make the movement from *enstasis* to *exstasis*, from our supra-temporal *Existenz* to that of immanent *Inexistenz*.” This entire mode of speech is totally **foreign** to Dooyeweerd's thought.

4.10 The complexity of the relation between individuality and universality

Where a quotation is given from Dooyeweerd (NC, III: 54) it does not warrant the way in which Friesen alludes to the opposition of “individual” and “universal”. In Dooyeweerd's thought the issue of the universal and the individual is more complicated – it is actually influenced by the modern nominalistic tradition since the Renaissance. Dooyeweerd conflates the law-side of reality with the universality evinced at the factual side (namely the lawfulness or orderliness of factual reality). Consequently, by identifying law and lawfulness (“wet” and “wetmatigheid”), Dooyeweerd strips factual reality from its universal side. Similar to nominalism he merely acknowledges the individual factual side. Friesen does not seem to be informed about this issue.

4.11 Does “abstraction” bridge the gap?

Friesen explains that Von Baader says “that we ourselves make the individual parts by a division of the simple impression received by the soul” where this “division is an analytical act” in order to relate Dooyeweerd's views about abstraction to those of Von Baader. Yet, beyond the verbal similarity of the word “analytical” there is nothing but a conceptual abyss between the two views.¹⁴

14 In conclusion a few few relatively unrelated issues are mentioned. (i) Dooyeweerd simply does not **at all** have a theory of “theory as ” (ii) In his discussion of the notion

5. Concluding remark

Although the Romantic movement at the beginning of the 19th century exerted a considerable influence upon the subsequent development of philosophy, particularly in its organicistic orientation, the complexities involved in the attempt to find a historical connection between the thought of Von Baader and Dooyeweerd rendered the attempt of Friesen to demonstrate such a connection unsound.

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of a theoretical synthesis Friesen confuses two issues: (a) the intermodal synthesis and (b) a truly dualistic religious dialectic. (iii) Dooyeweerd's idea of positivization is not at all found in Von Baader – in spite of the far-fetched attempts made by John Friesen to demonstrate it. (iv) The statement: "The transcendental ground of our being is that which makes possible our autonomy, the idolization of the temporal" – with reference to *NC*, I, 31 – does not reflect Dooyeweerd's view in any way.

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