How 'individual' are individual entities?

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Opsomming

Twee resente volumes van die versamelde werke van Dooyeweerd wat onlangs verskyn het is met ten minste een probleem gemoeid wat dwarsdeur die geskiedenis van die filosofie aangetref is, naamlik die probleem van individualiteit of van dit wat individueel is. Hierdie probleem is ten nouste verbonde aan die universaliteit van wette vir subjekte en van die ooreenstemmende wetmatigheid van sulke subjekte. Die eerste komplikasie is dat individualiteit steeds 'n universele eienskap bly van elke individu. Alhoewel dit Dooyeweerd se bedoeling was om rekenskap van die wet vir individuele dinge te gee deur die uitdrukking individualiteitstruktuur *in te voer, het hierdie nuwe term dubbelsinnig gebly. Aanvanklik het Dooyeweerd na die "individuele struktuur" verwys en somtyds het die element "struktuur" geossilleer tussen* wet vir *en* gestruktureer deur *as betekenisonderskeidinge. Die idees van 'n* tipe-wet *en 'n identiteitstruktuur kan verkieslik as alternatiewe uitdrukkings gebruik word. Die idee van 'n tipe-wet is aanvullend tot die idee van modale wette en bevat geen* essensialistiese *aannames soos wat Stafleu en Klapwijk beweer nie. Hulle siening is beïnvloed deur die funksionalistiese oriëntasie van die moderne natuurwetenskappe sedert die*

Renaissance. In hierdie artikel word 'n vlugtige vergelyking getref tussen die sienings van Klapwijk en Darwin, waarin gefokus word op universele modale wette – modaal fisiese wette in die geval van Darwin en modaal biotiese wette in die geval van Klapwijk. Laasgenoemde spesifiseer bloot die universele sin van die modale aspekte. Dat die rasionalistiese tradisie sedert Descartes geen ruimte laat vir individualiteit nie word vlugtig toegelig, met verwysing na die weergawe van Frank en Haverkamp, terwyl ten besluite verwys is na hul romantiese waardering van wat individueel is.

Abstract

Two recently published works of the Collected Works of Dooyeweerd share at least one problem found throughout the history of philosophy, namely the problem of individuality or of what is individual. This problem is intimately related to the universality of laws for subjects and the corresponding law-conformity of such subjects. The first complication is that individuality remains a universal feature of everything individual. Although Dooyeweerd intended to account for the law which holds for individual things by introducing the expression individuality structure, this new term appeared to be ambiguous. Initially Dooyeweerd even referred to an "individual structure" and sometimes the element "structure" oscilates between law for and being constructed by as meaning nuances. The ideas of a type law and an identity-structure are preferable alternative expressions. The idea of a type-law is complementary to the idea of modal laws but does not entail essentialistic assumptions as suggested by Stafleu and Klapwijk. Their view is influenced by the functionalist orientation of the modern natural sciences since the Renaissance. In this article a brief comparison between the views of Klapwijk and Darwin is given, focusing on universal modal laws – modal physical laws in the case of Darwin and modal physical and biotical laws in the case of Klapwijk. Both deny genuine biotical type-laws. The latter merely specify the universal meaning of modal aspects. That the rationalistic tradition since Descartes does not allow for individuality is briefly highlighted with reference to the account of Frank and Haverkamp and in conclusion their portrayal of the romantic appreciation of what is individual is mentioned.

1. The question of individuality

During 2010 and 2011 two apparently unrelated works appeared as part of the on-going publication of the *Collected Works* of Herman Dooyeweerd. In 2010 *The Crisis in Humanist Political Theory*, *As seen from a Calvinist cosmology and epistemology* (B Series, Volume 7) appeared, and in 2011 *Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy 3*; *Philosophy of Nature and Philosophical Anthropology* (A Series, Volume 7). What can these two works have in common? One answer is: the problem of what is individual (or individuality).

Although one might have expected that Dooyeweerd would have emphasized the law-idea of his new "Philosophy of the Law-idea" he actually states in Volume B7 of his Collected Works (the English translation of the original Dutch work from the year 1931): "Theoretically, individuality is the central problem of temporal reality" (Dooyeweerd, 2010:19). This remark becomes all the more significant when one investigates the ambiguities surrounding the terms *individual* and *individuality* in this work. In the history of philosophy the relationship between *universality* and *individuality* is known as one of the classical philosophical problems. The status assigned to what is universal generated two opposing views, namely that of *realism* and *nominalism*. The realistic approach accepted a threefold existence for the *universalia*: Firstly, the Platonic ideas "settled" in "God's mind." Secondly, the Aristotelian universal substantial forms were located inherent in things and thirdly, realism acknowledged universal concepts within the *human mind*. Nominalism rejected any universality outside the human mind but did not realize that. Plato actually discovered God's *law*[1] *for* creatures and Aristotle

1 Most people will associate the distinction between law and subject first of all with physical laws and physical subjects, such as the law of energy conservation, non-decreasing entropy or the law of gravity holding for material things such as atoms, molecules, macromolecules and physical processes. Some may think of the laws made by a state to which everyone on the territory of the state is subject (also think of the distinction between government and subjects). However, Dooyeweerd has a universal cosmic understanding in mind, which intends to apply the distinction between law/norm and subject to all aspects of reality and to all kinds or types of entities as well (see note 6 below).

stumbled upon the *lawfulness* (orderliness, law-conformity) of God's creatures.[2]

Although Dooyeweerd is acquainted with the opposition of realism and nominalism he did not realize that the difference between the Platonian and Aristotelian views implicitly reflects the distinction between (God's law as) the universal *order for* and the universal *orderliness of* whatever is subjected to God's law. As a consequence he uses the terms *wet* (law) and *wetmatigheid* (law-conformity) interchangeably. Conforming to a law, however, is a (universal) feature of what is *subjected* to that law. It is preferable to designate this subject side as the *factual side* of reality. (Vollenhoven, by contrast, *did* acknowledge universality on the factual side of reality.) Dooyeweerd considers the factual side to be strictly *individual* consistent with his quoted remark that "individuality is the central problem of temporal reality".

Of course the first problem of such an emphasis on individuality is that, although it is intended to acknowledge only what is *individual* on the factual side of reality, the employment of the term *individuality* itself actually highlights a *universal trait* of concretely existing entities. Such entities therefore function on the subject side or factual side of reality: the *universal feature* at stake is the *individuality* of every individual entity. Stated differently: *being individual* is a universal trait displayed by *every individual* entity! The definite and indefinite articles serve to distinguish between what is *individual* and what is *universal*: *this chair* (individual side) is *a chair* (universal side).

In *The Crisis …* Dooyeweerd's consistent intention to see factual reality as purely individual is reflected in those instances where he speaks of "the individual structure of things". When it appeared in 1931 the general philosophical climate already experienced the so-called *linguistic turn* which inspired Dooyeweerd to use the term "zin" = "meaning" as a substitute for "organic".[3] Combined with this

2 References to the original works of Plato and Aristoteles to be found in Strauss, 2009 (pp.67 en 105, 164 e.v., 177, 199, 371).

3 The term "zin" brings to expression that everything is created from, through and to God.

new qualifier, namely *zin* (meaning – reflecting his sensitivity for the mentioned "linguistic turn"),[4] Dooyeweerd now introduced combined expressions such as *meaning-individual* – still aimed at underscoring his view that factual reality is purely individual.[5]

A few years after 1931 Dooyeweerd published his three volume *magnum opus* under the title: *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* (eventually translated as *The Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea*). In this work Dooyeweerd gives preference to the term *individuality structure*. His primary intention with this expression is to refer to God's law for concretely existing (individual) entities.

Yet a further terminological complication arises from the word "structure" – which can either mean "law for" or "lawfulness of". The standard practice in the English language is to speak of *structures* with reference to entities that are *structured* (*by God's law*). This meaning-nuance captured the way in which entities are *structured* in the sense of being *constructed*. Since entities (in their structuredness) are not themselves laws, they merely display, in their law-conformity, their structuredness (subjectedness) to laws (by *being* this or that). Later on, when Dooyeweerd developed his theory of *enkaptic interlacements* in more detail, he intended to account for the intertwinement of creaturely subjects, but his terminology, given his denial of universality on the factual side of reality, creates the misleading impression that his theory is concerned with an interlacement of "laws" – an interlacement of "individuality structures".

4 The term "zin" increasingly replaced the idea of an *organic coherence*, although the phrase "organic coherence" did not disappear altogether in his later works.

5 In passing we mention the other composite phrases in this new work, such as: meaning-analogies; meaning-analysis; meaning-boundaries; meaning-character; meaning-clarity; meaning-coherence; meaning-criterion; meaning-elements; meaning-functions; meaning-individual; meaning-individuality; meaning-substrates; meaning-synthesis; meaning-functional; meaning-individual; meaning many-sidedness; meaning-side; meaning-structure; and meaning-systatic. When these phrases are "turned around", for example when the expression "zin-functioneele concept of law" is not translated as the "meaning-functional concept of law" but as "the functional meaning of law", the original intention is lost. Consequently in the English translations of Dooyeweerd's works these qualified phrases are maintained for the sake of Dooyeweerd's systematic preference, namely to use the term "meaning" in this qualifying way.

In the second above-mentioned work of the philosophy of nature, the idea of an individuality structure occupies a central position. Its main focus is to give a *systematic* account of the structure and interlacement of non-living and living entities, including plants, animals and human beings. Initially, in the Dutch edition of his *Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea* (*De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*), Dooyeweerd did not acknowledge a *foundational function* for material things, plants or animals. However, in his extensive article on the substance concept in the philosophy of nature, he explained that analyzing an enkaptic structural whole, points in the opposite direction (see Dooyeweerd, 1950:75 note 8 and Dooyeweerd, 1940:220 note 49).

Dooyeweerd introduced the concept of *individuality structure* in order to explain the nature of individual things (both natural and societal entities). Over the years there have been various attempts to create alternative terms, some of which are described below. Thus the structural laws for the state, marriage, works of art, mosquitoes, sodium chloride, and so forth are referred to as *individuality structures*. The idea of an individual whole is determined by an individuality structure preceding the theoretical analysis of its modal functions. The identity of an individual whole is a relative unity in a multiplicity of functions. Hendrik Van Riessen prefers to name this law for entities an *identity-structure*, since it guarantees the persistent identity of all entities (Van Riessen, 1970:158). More recently, Jacob Klapwijk also proposed to speak of identity-structures (see Klapwijk, 2009:249). In his work *Alive, …* Magnus Verbrugge introduced his own distinct systematic account concerning the nature of what he calls *functors*, a word first introduced by Hendrik Hart to refer to individuality structures (Hart, 1984:445-46). As a substitute for the notion of an individuality structure, Verbrugge advances the term *idionomy* (Verbrugge, 1984: 42, 81 ff., 91 ff.). Of course this term may also cause misunderstanding if it is taken to mean that *each individual creature* (subject) has its *own unique law*. What is intended is that every type of law (*nomos*) delimits and determines unique subjects. In other words, however specified the universality of law may be, it can never, in its bearing upon unique

individual creatures, itself become something uniquely individual. Another way of grasping the meaning of Dooyeweerd's notion of an individuality structure is, in following an oral suggestion by Roy Clouser,[6] to call it a *type-law* (from the Greek: *typonomy*). This simply means that all entities of a certain *type* conform to this *law*. The following perspective by Marinus Stafleu elucidates this terminology in a systematic way (see Stafleu, 1980:6, 11): "typical laws [type-laws/typonomies], such as the Coulomb law – applicable only to charged entities and the Pauli principle (applicable only to fermions) – are special laws that apply only to a limited class of entities, whereas modal laws hold universally for all possible entities." One also considers the expression *entity structures* (see Strauss, 1980), recently followed by Troost in his work on the philosophy of the science of faith (see Troost, 2004). The term *entity* comprises both the *individuality* and the *identity* of the individual thing under consideration – therefore it accounts for the respective emphases found in Dooyeweerd's notion of individuality structures and in Van Riessen and Klapwijk's notion of identity-structures. The following words of Dooyeweerd show that both the individuality and identity of an entity are determined by its "individuality structure": "In general we can establish that the factual temporal duration of a thing as an individual and identifiable whole is dependent on the preservation of its structure of individuality" (Dooyeweerd, 1997-III:79).[7]

Both Stafleu and Klapwijk adhere to the view that the idea of *type laws* should be seen as a form of *essentialism*. For example, when it is asserted that the meaning nucleus of the arithmetical aspect is *discrete quantity*, the way in which Stafleu understands *zin* (*meaning*) disqualifies it as *essentialistic*, because it does not contain a reference to the *origin*. In fact, Stafleu does not hesitate to invoke the development of modern natural science in its reaction to the essentialistic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle in this context. He says that the question regarding the *essence* disappeared from modern natural

6 Communication at a conference in Zeist, the Netherlands, August 1986.

7 A more extensive discussion of ambiguities in Dooyeweerd's understanding of individuality structures is found in Strauss, 2009:449-53.

science, and therefore it also should not find shelter in a "relational philosophy".

However, this is a deviation from Dooyeweerd's original idea. From the early 1920s, Dooyeweerd took a principled stance in opposition to both the *substantialistic* ("essentialistic") orientation of Greek-Medieval philosophy and the *functionalistic* ("relationalistic") orientation of *modern natural science*.[8]

An integral cosmonomic idea, i.e. an encompassing idea of creation in its unity (coherence/relatedness) and diversity (uniqueness/irreducibility), has to affirm both sides of the coin – *uniqueness* and *coherence*. Dooyeweerd repeatedly emphasizes that *meaning* comes to expression in the *coherence* ("relation") between distinct (unique) aspects of reality.[9]

Reference (relatedness/relation) depends on uniqueness, which depends on coherence. In the sense of concept-transcending knowledge, the ideas of uniqueness and (inter-modal) coherence explore modal numerical and spatial terms stretched beyond the boundaries of these aspects. It is not a sign of "essentialism" when the uniqueness of aspects and entities is acknowledged. However, not being willing to speak of the "nature" of things does not avoid references to "denatured" *things*, which explains why Stafleu nonetheless still has to speak of the relations of (or between) *things* (cf. Stafleu, 2002:158 ff. and 244 ff.)!

The (early 20th century) Neo-Kantian philosopher, Heinrich Rickert, continues the functionalistic tradition with his view that the natural sciences have to proceed in a generalizing fashion, in contrast to the individualizing mode of thought predominant in the (historical) humanities (Rickert, 1913:68-69, 173). Rickert initially develops this

8 For an analysis of the shortcomings of the Aristotelian-Thomistic substance concept, see Geert ter Horst, 2008.

9 As is well-known Dooyeweerd distinguishes between 15 different *modes of being*, *aspects* or *modalities*, namely the numerical aspect, the spatial aspect, the aspect of motion, the physical aspect, the biotical aspect, the sensory aspect, the logical-analytical aspect, the cultural-historical aspect, the sign mode, the social aspect, the economic aspect, the aesthetic aspect, the jural aspect, the moral aspect and the certitudinal aspects.

perspective by binding the natural sciences to the ideal of transforming all *concepts of things* into *concepts of function* (also designated as *concepts of relations*). This Neo-Kantian view of the natural sciences remains completely faithful to the aim of the classical science ideal, namely to reduce all reality to some *modal aspect*, *function* or *relation*. According to Rickert, the (functionalistic) logical ideal of the natural sciences finds its limit in the uniqueness (individuality) of experiential reality itself.

Moreover, highlighting the functionalistic background of an emphasis on relations is further supported by the fact that Stafleu views laws as *timeless*. "Individual things and events are intrinsically temporal, ... The timeless character conditions the existence of individuals concerned in their temporal circumstances" (Stafleu, 2002:14). The term "character" is used by Stafleu to replace Dooyeweerd's term "individuality structure". Rickert also holds that values have an *ideal*, *timeless* being.

However, as soon as Stafleu has to articulate more precisely what "characters" are concerned with, he takes recourse to the precision provided by *modal* terms. Then he offers a description that looks like a quasi-compound basic concept: "A character determines an unlimited complete class of temporal subjects" (Stafleu, 2002:14). The term "determines" derives from the modal meaning of the *physical aspect*, the terms "unlimited" and "complete" from the *spatial mode*, and the word "class" from a combination of the *numerical* and *spatial aspects*. The use of a metaphor, such as figuratively designating a *type-law* as a *character*, in the final analysis requires modal terms if a precise meaning is desired.

Stafleu says that he defines a character (the equivalent of what Dooyeweerd designates as an individuality structure) as a cluster of immutable ("onveranderlijke") natural laws instead of speaking of their *constancy*, because when anticipatory meaning moments are disclosed on the law-side of an aspect, then the-law-side itself in fact changes.

2. Constant modal laws versus variable type-laws?

Klapwijk argues that the mere acknowledgement of the "whatness" of entities by definition results in an unacceptable *essentialism*. As

ontic *a priori's* only universal modal laws are acknowledged by Klapwijk: "If the analyses of this book are correct, then biological laws are not typically but only modally determined. They present themselves as a limited set of universal, level-bound principles but with germinative power and an inconceivable adaptive ability" Klapwijk, 2008:254).

On the previous page, however, Klapwijk apparently does acknowledge *type-laws*.

> I shall not contradict essentialism's claim that the living world is characterized by type-laws. There are countless laws determinative of a particular type of micro-organism, plant, or animal. Consider microbes such as *Vibrio cholera*, the cholera bacterium, that moves by means of a flagellum. Plants such as *Kalanchoe daigremontiana* multiply by small plants on the leaves of the maternity plant. Also consider the many spiders, like *Latrodectus mactans*, the black widow, that catch their prey in a web made of very fine protein threads. Indeed, the cellular structure, the pattern of growth, and the behavior of all species is type-bound. These types are determined by law.[10]

Yet, these type-laws are not *genuine laws* but merely variable, although relatively durable "formulas" (patterns) appreciated as "standard applications of elementary biological principles" (similar to positivizations of normative principles) (Klapwijk, 2009:253):

> Thus, type laws are not to be ignored. They are a spontaneous and obvious presupposition in our daily life experience. They are also an obvious and unconscious starting-point in our biological research. However, type laws do not have a separate status. They are not to be identified with irreducible essences that originated from an original creating Word. Even less are they to be associated with an intelligent design that would have been inserted, in between times, so to speak, in the phylogeny of a population.

10 In the Dutch text of this work (*Heeft de Evolutie een Doel*?) the last sentence reads: "Deze typen zijn wetmatig bepaald" (Klapwijk, 2009:246). "Wetmatig" points at something subject to law, for only something subject to law can display the measure ("maat") of the law. The English translation therefore corrected the Dutch text inadvertently.

> Type-laws can be considered standard applications of elementary biological principles. They are ingenious key formulas that have been repeatedly tested in the evolutionary process, and codified, letter by letter, in the genome of every living organism in order to survive in the struggle for existence (Klapwijk, 2008:254).

The "elementary biological principles" refer to one of the above-mentioned universal modal aspects of reality, acknowledged by Klapwijk as "ontic apriori's". His statement contains a subtle ambiguity, because instead of speaking of the adaptability of living things belonging to a specific level (namely that of *biotic subjects*), it treats these "level-bound principles" as if they themselves are entities with "germinative power and an inconceivable adaptive ability" (Klapwijk, 2008:243).

When Dooyeweerd (1959) critically discusses Lever's work on *Creation and Evolution* (1956) he speaks of the "successive realization of ordering types" and sees the *phyla* as the highest of ordering types, and species as the lowest (Klapwijk mistakenly identifies Dooyeweerd's idea of ordering types with the species level). Throughout all of this, Dooyeweerd consistently upholds the distinction between the law-side and the factual side of reality. Under the heading of "[T]he successive realization of individuality structures as ordering-types of the plant and animal world", Dooyeweerd emphasizes: "The structural types of plants and animals as such are indeed not individual subjects that originate in the temporal process of becoming, for much rather they are ordering types belonging to the law-side and not the factual side of our empirical world. They can only realize themselves in transient individual living beings, but as ordering types they necessarily bear a constant and foundational character in the time order. This is the case because they *make possible* our experience of the plant and animal world irrespective of the way in which we *theoretically* envisage the *process of origination* of living beings" (Dooyeweerd, 1959:132).

Dooyeweerd never casts his idea of individuality structures in the terms used by Klapwijk: "irreducible essences". Dooyeweerd focuses on the *constancy* of God's law, which lies at the foundation of

various *types* of entities. The crucial question to the view advanced by Klapwijk is therefore: why does he jump to the accusation of "essences" when the *constancy* of type-laws is at stake, but not when the universality and *constancy* of (ontic) modal aspects are defended? As noted, he states that "biological laws" are only "modally determined", because they form part of "a limited set of universal, level-bound principles", among which we find the biotic as one of the various modal aspects of reality distinguished by Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven.

3. Modal universality specified in a typical way

The idea of *type-laws* aims at accounting for the fact that different entities *specify* the universal modal meaning of the various aspects of reality in peculiar (i.e. *typical*) ways. For example, both a state and a business enterprise can *waste* their money (and thus act *uneconomically*), and both ought to function under the guidance of economic *frugality*. This fact is stated from the perspective of the economic aspect in its modal universality, i.e. by disregarding the *typical* nature of the business and the state. This entails that modal laws hold universally without any specification. The implication of modal universality is that universities, businesses, states, families and sport clubs must observe the general meaning of economic norms, insofar as they function within the general modal structure of this aspect.

In other words, this is an instance of the general perspective that the modal universality of every aspect embraces all possible entities ("objects") functioning within all modalities.

By contrast, a law holding for a specific kind or type of entity does not hold for *every possible* kind or type of entity. Such a type-law nonetheless retains its universality, although its universality is *specified* and *typified*. The type-law for *being a state* is universal in the sense that it holds for *all* states. Yet this type-law is specified in the sense that it applies to states only. The other side of this coin is observed in the uniqueness of the state and a business enterprise respectively functioning within the economic aspect in different ways (consider the difference between *profit* and *tax*).

Stafleu, in various articles and books, correctly distinguishes between modal laws and type laws. For example, thermodynamics, as a general functional physical discipline that abstracts from the typicality of physical entities is not interested in the gaseous, solid, or fluid state as such, but concerns statistical physics, where the connection between the micro- and macro-structures is investigated. It makes a difference when it concerns the solid or the gaseous state (see Stafleu, 1966:134).

It is the existence of type-laws that enables us to *classify* physical entities and place them in various *categories*. The typical nature of an entity specifies the modal meaning of the aspects in which it functions, but at once it also exceeds the boundaries of any single aspect. In addition it should be acknowledged that the dimensions of aspects and (natural and social) entities are *mutually irreducible*. These typical natures of entities provide a peculiar "coloring" to their modal functions. Most importantly, type-laws do not hold for every possible kind of entity – they apply to a limited class of entities. Stafleu explains this distinction as follows (Stafleu, 1980:11; cf. pp. 6 ff.):

> Hereby we distinguish laws that are valid for a limited class of subjects (typical laws) from those that are valid for all kinds of subjects (modal laws). Typical laws, in principle, delineate the class of subjects to which they apply, describing their strutures and typical properties. Examples of such laws are the Coulomb law (applicable only to charged subjects), the Pauli principle (applicable to fermions), etc. Often the law describing the structure of a particular subject (e.g., the copper atom) can be reduced to more general laws (e.g., the electromagnetic laws in quantum physics). On the other hand, modal laws are those that have universal validity. For example, the law of gravitation applies to all physical subjects, regardless of their typical structure. We call them modal laws because, rather than circumscribing a certain class of subjects, they describe a *mode* of being, relatedness, experience, or explanation.

It should be noted that since both Klapwijk and Darwin accept universal *physical laws*, their view of such laws is not nomina-

listic.[11] But they differ in respect of *biotic laws* ("biological laws") because Klapwijk does acknowledge universal (ontic) biotic (and other modal) laws, something never asserted by Darwin. Only within the domain of physics (and the material world) does Darwin continue to subscribe to universal (and constant) *natural* laws, but as soon as living entities enter the scene, Darwinists deny any *typicality* while rejecting the existence of *biotic* laws. Darwin does speak of a "general law of nature" (Darwin, 1968:143) and of "a universal law of nature" (Darwin, 1968:268, see also pp. 143 (2x), 147, 427, and 445) – but he never speaks of *biotical* laws of nature – even when biotic phenomena are at stake. For him, physical laws (or natural laws) are sufficient – an underlying *physicalism* dominates his entire work, *On the Origin of Species* (see Strauss, 2007).

Of course the issues discussed in this article are closely related to the problems of biological thinking regarding the generally assumed evolution from molecules to human beings, but since I have analyzed the problems involved in these views in different other articles in this journal, it can be left aside for the moment.

4. Related problems

In the light of the preceding analysis it is clear that the idea of identity-structures and type-laws are complementary. Therefore it is completely justified to designate such laws as type-laws. But given all the possible misunderstandings generated by the expression *individuality structure*, it may be wise to avoid it in the further development of our reformational legacy within philosophy.

What has been achieved with our analysis is to show that it is incorrect to refer to what is individual merely by using the term indivi-

11 The term "nominalism" designates the way in which a thinker understands universality, the so-called *universalia*. Whereas *realism* attributed a threefold existence to the *universalia* (before creation in God's mind, inherent within the things and afterwards as universal concepts within the human mind), nominalism denies any form of universality outside the human mind, it accepts only universal concepts within the human mind. Nominalism in fact rejects any universal *order or* and any universal *orderliness of creatures*.

duality without any further qualification, because individuality is still a *universal feature* of whatever is individual. The only way to account for what is individual is to realize that what is individual exceeds the grip of conceptual knowledge, because the latter is always bound to *universal* features. In a recently published work Janich once more captures the age-old legacy upon which this insight rests: *individuum ineffabile* (an individual is inexpressible, indescribable). To this he adds the additional conviction attached to it by the medieval scholastic tradition: *de singularibus non est scientia* (no science is possible about what is singular) (see Janich, 2009:110). Ultimately the problem of what is individual is in need of the recognition of a kind of knowledge – transcending conceptual knowledge. The best way to do it is to explore the possibilities of what I prefer to designate as *concept-transcending knowledge*. An essential element of this distinction is that it enables us to articulate a different definition of *rationalism* and *irrationalism*.

Dooyeweerd holds the view that rationalism absolutizes the law side of reality and that irrationalism deifies the individual factual side of reality. However, as an after-effect of modern nominalism Dooyeweerd does not acknowledge universality on the factual side of reality. For this reason he identifies *law* and *law-conformity*. Yet in being what it is, every individual entity, in a universal way, shows (through its law-conformity or orderliness) that it is subject to a universal law for its existence. Consequently it seems more appropriate to say that rationalism absolutizes universality, which amounts to saying that it reifies *conceptual knowledge* (conceiving has its foundation in universal traits). By contrast, irrationalism deifies what is individual, i.e., it absolutizes concept-transcending knowledge.

The (universal) conditions for being this or that type of thing must always be distinguished from the (universal) way in which particular entities evince their conformity with these conditions (laws). In being an atom or being human, this or that atom or human being shows that it meets the conditions for what it is.

Manfred Frank and Anselm Haverkamp, in a series on “Poetik und Hermeneutik”, co-edited a work on “Individualität”. In their joint *Introduction* they refer to Descartes for whom individuality does not

play any role. In classical German idealism the highest task of the intellect is seen in renouncing and denying individuality. It is done on behalf of the analytical "equality" of everything in the "concept of a genus" as the aim of all intellectual education (*Bildung*).[12] They position Husserl in the same (rationalistic) tradition who, in spite of changed circumstances, in his "Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft" (Philosophy as a Rigorous Discipline), does not allow access to individuality. He also refers to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (Volume I, § 26) (Frank & Haverkamp, 1988:xiii).

By contrast they mention the romantic understanding of individuality as it is found in the thought of Schlegel, Schleiermacher and Von Humboldt. Their central idea is that the "single" or "individual" points at an element or part which can never, from the concept of a whole, be reached by means of a logical chain of deductions. What is universal is viewed as a universality that is individually interpreted (Frank & Haverkamp, 1988:xiv). According to Frank the history of philosophy neglected the distinction between a particular ("besondern"), and singular mode of being of the subject (Frank, 1988:11). This distinction appears to run parallel with the distinction between specified universality (orderliness) and what is individual. A more extensive account of the mode of knowledge which is required to explain how we know what is individual will not be given here. It will take us beyond the scope of the current article.[13]

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12 "Für Descartes spielt Individividualität gar keine Rolle. Der klassiche deutsch Idealismus sah die höchste Aufgabe der Vernunft darin, 'daß die Individualität theoretisch vergessen, praktisch verleugnet werde'. 'Die unbedingte Verwerfung aller Individualität' zugunsten der analytischen 'Gleichheit' aller im 'Begriff der Gattung' ist ihm das Ziel aller 'Bildung' " (Frank and Haverkamp, 1988:xiii).

13 I have treated this problem from diverse angles in my work on philosophy as the discipline of disciplines – see Strauss, 2009:13, 64, 176, 178, 182, 193, 205, 360, 416, 430, 447, 449, 455, 460, 463-464, 613-614.

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