





An analysis of anxiety in the works of Martin Heidegger, Frantz Fanon, and Sigmund Freud: Integrative literature review

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Abstract – This paper analysed anxiety in the works of Martin Heidegger, Frantz Fanon, and Sigmund Freud from an integrative literature review perspective. Based on synthesised literature, it is established that while for Heidegger and Freud, anxiety means the natural indicator of a person living their authentic lifecycle, aware of their living and mortality towards their death with conviction and purpose, Fanon perceives anxiety as something all individuals inevitably experience as part of the actual reactions to everyday life challenges. Heidegger, Fanon, and Freud's perspectives of anxiety define anxiety as freedom's dizziness, that is, people learning to ultimately and correctly live with their anxieties. Heidegger, Freud, and Fanon endeavour to distinguish clearly between existential, neurotic, and normal anxiety to indicate that the misdiagnosis of "normal" anxiety as a disorder result in current concerns and irresponsibility in people's actions and choices. Therefore, the paper recommends that psychologists in education and people with anxiety should understand that appreciating the inner stimuli as disturbing some basic and inherent equilibrium state in a person helps appreciate responses to anxiety stimuli.

Keywords: Anxiety, Stimuli, Repression, Ego

To cite this article (APA): Ally, A., & Aloka, P. J. O. (2025). An analysis of anxiety in the works of Martin Heidegger, Frantz Fanon, and Sigmund Freud: Integrative literature review. *International Journal of Studies in Psychology*, 5(2), 36-45. <https://doi.org/10.38140/ijpspy.v5i2.1835>

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS conceptual paper analysed the concept of anxiety in the works of Martin Heidegger, Frantz Fanon, and Sigmund Freud. This paper presents a synthesis, discussion, and comparison of Freud, Heidegger, and Fanon's perspectives.

Secularising anxiety

Fanon, Freud, and Heidegger infer that anxiety prevails as a contrasting feature of the secularisation process. The above theorists agree that anxiety is indistinguishably connected to the emergence of capitalism, the resultant differentiation between the social and individual, childhood and adulthood, pathology, and normalcy (Venn, 2020). Heidegger and Freud offer relatively clear similarities between their accounts of anxiety, in that both regard anxiety as boredom, which is an added component of fear (Mendieta, 2020). Heidegger and Freud single out that while actual fears like phobias of public spaces, death, or darkness enable people to mitigate anxiety, anxiety is an essential affectedness or people's existence that aids the potential disclosure of the world's totality, including the individuality of self, existence, and time's finite nature (Fischer, 2020; Freeman & Elpidorou, 2020).

Moreover, Freud and Heidegger perceive anxiety as indicating people's failure to participate in the world. On the contrary, Fanon contends that people become themselves (self) only when they have the courage to experience such moods instead of avoiding them. They are challenged with existence, individual finitude, the necessity for freedom, and confrontation (Tang, 2020; Yehuda, 2021). Freud and Heidegger support the sin element by confining the perspectives of anxiety to people's sinful experiences like bad conscience and guilt. However, unlike Freud and Heidegger, who speculated about people's phylogenetic anxiety, trauma, and/or upset in the pursuit of realistic roots of neurotic anxiety, Franz Fanon argues anxiety is the

psychological outcome of sin and prohibition as well as psychological presuppositions of the original sin dogma (Fernandez-Alvarez, 2021; Orelus, et al., 2020).

While Freud and Heidegger insist that dogma is anything positing itself, Fanon introduces a vital distinction that is crucial to Freud's repression theory, that is, the distinction between mechanisms of becoming sinful and being sinful (Alparone & La Rosa, 2020; Fehlmann, 2020). Fanon contends that whereas being helps explain people's sin and anxiety, the mechanisms whereby the person turns sinful (a clear evolution from their innocence to their sinfulness) are only explainable through the anxiety concept (Marriott, 2021). Fanon insists that psychology's mood entails the discovery of anxiety and the use of anxiety psychologies to portray sin. Consequently, anxiety helps a person or itself bring forth the sin, not portrayal. Since anxiety is intrinsically ambiguous with the "guilt" question, the justifications for anxiety intermediating sinfulness and innocence are similarly the justification for anxiety becoming a vital concept of contemporary psychology (Librett, 2021b). All three theorists, Freud, Heidegger, and Fanon agree that a person with anxiety and guilt is certainly innocent because it is anxiety (as external power and not themselves) that gets hold of oneself. Anxiety is the power a person has never loved but was nervous about (Mauri, 2020). The sole psychological justification is that a person is guilty because they experienced anxiety, which they feared and loved simultaneously. Globally, nothing prevails as ambiguous because anxiety's conceptualisation comprises the dogma presupposition of the primary sin (Khan, 2021). Heidegger hardly refrains from manipulating ambiguity's inherent resources by alluding to the notion of guilt and clarifying it in terms of conscience and being toward the death of Dasein (Heidegger, 2010). The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics analyses the boredom phenomenon to disregard guilt consciousness and sin possibilities (Heidegger, 1995).

The approach moves away from Fanon's perspective of anxiety

where there is some guilt and presupposition of the original sin dogma, to Heidegger's perspective of anxiety, which comprises guilt and not sin, excluding the sense of sinfulness and guilt (Nir, 2020). In "Being and Time", Heidegger shows that excluding sin presents people with some secularised kind of Fanon's perspective of anxiety (Heidegger, 2010). Heidegger eliminates guilt to secularise further anxiety in "The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics." The restating term is boredom and not anxiety (Heidegger, 1995). Even though anxiety is "nothing" but a person's fear, shortage of external threat or determinate which comprises some sense of danger being internal or ubiquitous, and therefore closely linked to guilt. Despite denial by Heidegger, anxiety and guilt can barely be separated from the possibilities of tradition, culture, and sin (Ranasinghe, 2020). Contextual and textual transitions from anxiety are, therefore, consequences of secularisation wherein the theologically and morally excited psychological concepts of sinfulness, conscience, and guilt have experienced fundamental transformations that necessitate the redefinitions and re-evaluations of a person's relations with their experiences of nothingness, emptiness, or meaninglessness (Venn, 2020).

In other words, boredom can be considered a secularised form of anxiety since it does not involve a sense of sinfulness or a guilty conscience (Du Preez & Simmonds, 2021). Therefore, the considered sociological and historical transition from people's anxiety never appears as some linear procedure wherein anxiety replaces or suppresses a mood. Instead, the transitions occur as a bifurcation process. Bifurcation comprises breaking spiritual anxiety into ideal secular types of anxiety termed normal and pathological anxiety (Schwartz et al., 2020). However, unlike Freud's working perspective of normal anxiety that perceives fear as present in real danger, Fanon argues that normal anxiety must be distinguished from actual anxiety in that it is some type of distress which, as opposed to neurotic anxiety, hardly involves any danger or fear (Peker, 2020). Normal anxiety is ideally not anxiety but amounts to anxiety using the presentation of people's fears into the experiences of meaninglessness or emptiness.

Egan (2021) indicates that Heidegger offers another perspective of normal anxiety, indicating it must be held as a residue of initially undifferentiated spiritual anxiety, which never loaned itself to orderly diagnostic or psychopathological application. Today, normal anxiety prevails as a pervasive manifestation of itself as boredom. According to Freud, people's anxiety discloses itself as a conjecture of their repression theory. Repression is the cornerstone of psychoanalysis (Wati et al., 2020). Freud indicates that sin prevails as some original action while repression prevails as some reaction or after-pressure (Helenius, 2020). Freud and Heidegger both agree that anxiety persists regardless of the invalidation of sin during the recent and next phases of historically transforming peoples' asceticism and spirit (Spillane, 2021). For Freud, anxiety that underlies a person's spiritual practices remains consistent with their anxiety from compulsions and obsessions, including often considered normal compulsions. Freud insists that either way, anxiety is unexpressed except where the person does not perform, or their fear of such happening is somewhat instilled in their mind (LaMothe, 2020). Anxiety comprises various forms of pathology when a person expresses nervousness and/or cannot ignore it, including failure to perform or keep themselves busy. Stress or trauma-related disorder is the other form, which, for a long time, has been linked to modernity but lately differentiated from anxiety disorders as addictive and substance-related disorders like gambling (Yehuda, 2021).

Fanon indicates that just like obsessive-compulsive disorders, a person does not express anxiety unless there is an interruption of their patterns or practices (Napolin, 2020). Therefore, Freud, Heidegger, and Fanon agree that anxiety is some kind of atmosphere, mood, or attune that designates the phenomena between external and internal character. As with any other mood, a person's anxiety is the essential aspect of its existence, a phenomenon and not simply some epiphenomena or side effect (Kishik, 2020). Moreover, Freud, Heidegger, and Fanon's theories concur that anxiety arises out of a cause, boring and/or detrimental

object. According to Freud, Heidegger, and Fanon, people also become anxious without an anticipated occurrence or failure to participate in world activities. Therefore, anxiety means failure to find significance in everything encountered (Mitchell, 2020). Miller (2020) states that notions like meaninglessness, insignificance, or indifference form the core of Heidegger and Freud's account of anxiety even where people primarily isolate themselves from anxiety.

In addition, Heidegger, Freud, and Fanon concur that anxiety prevails as something that can occur suddenly because of experiencing boring situations, life experiences, or objects in terms of bravery (Wilmots et al., 2020). Anxiety, therefore, involves telling a person something they usually do not prefer to know or hear, thereby tying them to failure. As a mood, anxiety conveys the message of what Martin Heidegger terms an innermost need for Dasein freedom. Heidegger considers the moods of *Vereinzelung* (individualisation) when a person faces such an effective contest. Their anxiety instantly undermines the meaning of self and the world (Raffoul, 2020). Therefore, unlike Fanon, Heidegger and Freud's perspectives of anxiety label basic people's moods as defined by a lack of resolvable cause, an occurrence of failures in engaging the world, that is, failure in meaning synchronisation or formation, experience nothingness that is understood as meaninglessness and emptiness, sudden occurrence of anxiety and needs for courage to experience the moods, and f correctly) anxiety unveils the ability to individualise and the necessity of freedom (Yanes-Fernandez, 2021).

The arguments above establish that the ontological distinction between other moods and anxiety is that other people's moods prevail as a time concept. Anxiety is conceptualised, regardless of its peculiar temporality of *Gewesenheit* (having been) (Aho, 2020a). Anxiety generates a dialectic of authenticity that complicates and governs the general scrutiny of "being." In essence, anxiety prevails as the psychologically fear-linked mood. The theorists indicated that whereas moods and anxiety are intrinsically linked, Freud's emotional perspective of anxiety is inherently unclear with dogma and guilt. Freud's perspective of anxiety involves presuppositions of "original sin" through Heidegger's ontotheological or onto-ethical concept of anxiety wherein guilt prevails without sin (Krell, 2021). Fanon generally secularises spiritual commitments and/or the continuation of existing impetus (Backman, 2020). In Heidegger's work, Fanon's assertions on anxiety offer a difference between thinkers and spiritual writers that is elusive. In presenting his perspective of anxiety in "Being and Time," Heidegger refers to another occasional moment of salutation wherein Heidegger states that it is not a coincidence that the fear and anxiety phenomena ontically or ontologically prevail within the purview of theology (Sodeika, 2020). However, this implies that Fanon has certainly and ontologically dealt with anxiety within narrow limits (Ferruta, 2020).

For Heidegger and Freud, Fanon was unsuccessful in the existential interpretation of the anxiety phenomenon. Heidegger insists that it is ludicrous for Fanon to infer from such that only in their handling of anxiety can a person discover accurate ontological understandings (Hook, 2020a, 2020b). The existential problem is alien to Fanon, as if the concepts of anxiety, vision, and existence are intrinsically unrelated on the most ultimate level. In "The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics," Heidegger contradicts himself by easily defining anxiety as a discourse of moralising or upbuilding. In the applied awakening, where Fanon philosophically comprehended the concept of "decisive moment," anxiety is the possibility of a new era of philosophy (Heidegger, 1995). Research praises Fanon here for seizing the main argument, indicating how Heidegger failed to appreciate the primordial comprehension and temporality, which time is merely not a categorisation of the now-moments (Richards, 2021). However, the most critical perspective herein is that Heidegger hesitates to appreciate Fanon between praise and dismissal, and the moment of acknowledgment disproportionately appears rare given the obvious influence and profundity that Fanon has exerted on Heidegger. Such

minimisation of Fanon perspectives in Heidegger's works appears to deceive a certain resistance, reluctance, or compulsion on the part of Freud and Heidegger. Heidegger employs secularisation to draw heavily on Fanon and repeat key strands of Fanon perspectives on anxiety, including repetition (Herskowitz, 2021).

Regardless of how the repetition seems compulsive, Heidegger and Freud select everything to repeat, even where they unofficially attribute to specificity the significance of that which they select to repeat (ontic content) because of which the phenomenon chosen or concept is associated primarily with some human experience or conduct domain or inquiry field (Gaztambide, 2021). Unlike Fanon, Heidegger and Freud repeat the teachings and question the meaning of "being," believing that the actual originality of anxiety in their work comprises repetitions (Yanagino, 2020). The belief in the originality of anxiety is the repetition of themes and concepts that never survive such repetition or fail to stay explicit. Therefore, the justification for excluding other concepts and themes is largely unaccounted for because Freud and Heidegger disregarded the entity (specificity) of anxiety themes and concepts, methodically surviving the repetition (Gaztambide, 2020).

Guilt and anxiety

In terms of treating anxiety, Heidegger and Freud deliberately disregard the concept and dogma of sin, mainly its actuality, reality, possibility, and ideality. The two theorists disagree that from an ontological perspective, anxiety is a psychological and theological determination (Yanagino, 2020). Anxiety arises out of the "nothing." It accustoms at birth and discloses itself during possible freedom, appreciating oneself in terms of personal possibilities (Michaelsen, 2021). However, unlike Freud and Heidegger, Fanon conceptualises people's anxiety as all that clarifies their original sin as a presupposition of it. According to Fanon, a deliberation of anxiety leads necessarily to the original sin issue by mediating between sinfulness and innocence, freedom, and necessity. Fanon indicates that, as a concept, anxiety requires psychological treatment due to its inherent ambiguity. People express guilt out of such ambiguity that a person is concurrently guilty but innocent of being anxious (Fynsk, 2021). Anxiety prevails over some blameworthy foreign authority or power that has been lovingly drowned. Therefore, Fanon, Freud, and Heidegger agree that the sole psychological justification or explanation of ways sin prevails in the world is nothing in this world is vaguer (Brewer & Mendoza-de Jesús, 2021). Fanon defines anxiety and psychology by showing that no region can properly handle sin (Nedoh, 2020). Earnestness is the mood corresponding to the concept of sin and is why anxiety and sin are hardly managed within psychology, aesthetics, and metaphysics. Access to each region allows for falsifying the mood (Pearce, 2020). For light-minded or melancholy aesthetics, sin prevails as tragically or comically for each circumstance as a nonsensically annulled something than it must be properly conceived; that is, as an overcome thing.

Either way, mood falsification involves directly falsifying sin, "for instance, as some disharmony, abnormality, disease, and poison (Jech, 2020). Fanon insists that while sin hardly belongs to science, it seems a sermon subject wherein a person expresses themselves as an individual to a single person (Alfsvåg, 2020; Zahl, 2020). Psychology explains exclusively by observing the mood of discovering anxiety (Deane-Drummond, 2020). For Fanon, psychology remains obsessed with the sin question without access to sin's actuality. Unlike ethics, sin's possibility stays with it because ethics is hardly fooled and wastes no time on the deliberations (Berenskoetter, 2020). As psychology attains deep absorption of sin possibilities, it is unintentionally in the service of other sciences, which only wait for it to varnish to help psychology with explanations of anxiety. Whereas psychology systematically explores real sin possibilities, dogmatics clarifies genetic sin (ideal sin possibilities) (Pollefeyt, 2020). Therefore, deliberations on anxiety are of some psychological interest because the very psychological deliberation mood is that of anxiety discovery. However, psychological deliberation remains consumed by interests motivating it until self-exhaustion directly points to dogmatics (handling sin without distorting the

corresponding mood) (Kolínská, 2020).

The pointing and its directness arise out of meditating. As a concept, anxiety accomplishes the intermediation or determination between sinfulness and innocence, where a person is simultaneously innocent and guilty (Librett, 2021b). In such space, psychology compulsively depicts and observes sin's possibility in the mood Fanon defines as an antipathetic curiosity. Anxiety becomes absorbed deeply in sin's possibility that it carefully explores real possibilities of sin, quite like the psychoanalysis of Freud and not Heidegger's existential examination of "being" guilty because it validates nothing against or for the possibilities of sin. An analysis of Freud, Heidegger, and Fanon indicates that Heidegger praises Fanon as the theorist with the farthest analysis of anxiety because he adds a dogmatic context of a psychological account of the original sin problem (Himawan, 2020). Heidegger suggests a philosophical and ontological perspective of anxiety rather than Fanon's theological or psychological perspectives. In Heidegger's opinion, ontology or metaphysics of anxiety is neither indifferent nor disinterested. Ambiguity is vital to practicing philosophy instead of psychology (Shim, 2020). On the face of it, the differences between Fanon, Freud, and Heidegger in terms of anxiety are simply disciplinary or programmatic (Swainger, 2020).

The critical difference between Fanon and Heidegger with anxiety is that. In contrast, Fanon makes a point defining anxiety with the original sin dogma, and Heidegger considers guilt and anxiety regardless of the original sin dogma (Bidon-Chanal, 2021). Secularising anxiety is such disregard or regard that is already disguised in their mental specification of the sin dogma and psychological deliberation of anxiety. Heidegger seems to disregard sin forcibly and slightly when he maintains that not even sin possibility is established in the existential examination of "being" guilty (Rumelili, 2020). Heidegger secularises further anxiety by situating the nothingness experience in people's boredom and mundane as well as conceptualising anxiety in the non-theological setting, that is, without using terms that seem to belong to spiritual discourse and distinctions between inauthenticity and authenticity that map onto distinctions between profane and sacred (Irwin, 2020). While Heidegger widely utilises other concepts from "Being and Time," there is nearly no reference to guilt, falling, or calling for conscience when referring to anxiety (Heidegger, 1936).

Anxiety, boredom, and freedom

In contrast, Fanon, Heidegger, and Freud perceive anxiety as the privilege of revealing experiences of people's essentiality, rootlessness, and nullity (Wolfson, 2021). On the other hand, Fanon, Freud, and Heidegger agree that anxiety emanates from the repetition of an act or its omission. Fanon argues that whereas repetitive oppression (colonisation) makes an individual anxious, it also offers the person an opportunity to examine and develop needed solutions like violence in their attempt to get freedom. Conceptualising such resoluteness prevents the possibilities of "falling back" into earlier irresoluteness (Tafakori, 2021). Fanon insists that resolution is certain, irreversible, true, and free because of repeating the actual resolution and not designating supplementary phases in Dasein's oscillation movement between inauthenticity and authenticity. An in-directional movement of the deepening is the only remaining aspect when the form and the movement of an inauthentic or authentic pendulum or resolution stops (Miller, 2020).

Fanon argues that anxiety arises when people have for so long been taken for granted and when they are finally armed with conceptual gear to permit them re-examination of different Dasein characteristics discovered in the preparatory examination and readiness of themselves to devote the structures with temporal meanings (Lau, 2020). Fanon, Heidegger, and Freud suggest that a repetition of the analysis enables people to lose actual touch of known realities and rid themselves of the presence of "being," that is, understanding is a one-dimensional representation to give room to understanding the "being" as fundamentally durational, inconceivable in quasi-spatial or spatial terms. Repetition and introducing the concept of time into the "being"

is an approach that relates to one's past and develops alternatives to normal relations, including anxiety (Nikolova, 2021). Fanon insists that whereas past occurrences somewhat shape a person, their present belongs entirely or contains current situations (Burkhalter, 2021).

While Fanon and Heidegger agree that people only possess two approaches to relating with the past in their normal everydayness, that is, remember or forget it, Heidegger insists that Dasein is mostly and proximally lost in the *das Man* and exists in some self-oblivious lostness state (Teusch, 2021). However, in contrast to what a person may expect, remembering is no alternative to people's efforts to authentically remember their past, construct identities, and appropriately be themselves. Freud insists that people fail to recall that their forgetting is not just a failure to remember but forgetting certain conditions they remember (Laubscher et al., 2021). Fanon indicates that repetition comprises proper alternatives to forgetfulness rather than possession of memory. The "identity of indiscernible" principle is an ontological principle that states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common (Guerrero-Hernández, 2020; Smith et al., 2020).

Freud, Fanon, and Heidegger concur that no danger prevails in embracing inauthenticity once people attain and affirm an understanding because people will not detect the danger of discovering a forged simulacrum (Teusch, 2021). Realising that people's anxieties are primary to even the basic repression operations, Heidegger and Freud conclude that representation intentions are guilty senses and the most vital problem in civilisation development (Burkhalter, 2021). Heidegger, Freud, and Fanon indicate that heightening their guilt and loss of their happiness is the price people pay for efforts to avoid anxiety and advance civilisation. The guilt sense is nothing else at the bottom but some topographical anxiety variety that the deeper the anxiety, the deeper their culture (Marriott, 2021). For Fanon, Heidegger, and Freud, anxiety prevails as all that explains people's innocence-to-sinfulness transitions.

Intentional repression

According to Heidegger, Freud, and Fanon's theories, the three key different possibilities of obtaining madness or anxiety are the direct reactions to trauma making no sense and differences (bereavement), excluded direct reactions because of social circumstances, and consciously avoided direct reactions. However, the consciously avoided direct reactions differ from the initial possibilities as a condition qualifying the remaining possibilities and not as some examples (Teusch, 2021). Freud, Heidegger, and Fanon could not overemphasise that a person inhibits and suppresses anxiety in their wish to forget and intentionally represses their conscious thoughts (O'Shiel, 2021). Accordingly, people with anxiety act resolutely but are supposedly unconscious of their pursuit of a better coping strategy (Chancer & Shapiro, 2021).

Nevertheless, it is the application of intentionally in the first occurrences of repression in the writings of Freud just after expressions wish to forget that are adequately conspicuous. Still, all other "textual" evidence also indicates repressions as intentional presentations and actions (Ramjewan & Garlen, 2020). For instance, Freud insists before one can acquire hysteria for the first time, there must be the fulfillment of essential conditions, intentional repression of an idea from the consciousness, and exclusion from associative modifications. Additionally, repressing and forgetting to obtain the volitional faculties status as intentionality penetrates the levels of describing psychic mechanisms that generate people anxiety or hysteria (Szanto & Landweer, 2020). LeMothe (2021) finds that anxiety, therefore, involves actions, forgetfulness, and repression. Fanon and Heidegger agree that anxiety comprises intentional forgetting, involuntarily remembering, unintentional repetition, and intentional repression. The presence of intention offers room for people's interpretation using analytic construction and free association (Dennis et al., 2021). People with anxiety have a chance of regaining their subjecthood dignity if they develop biased concentration on assumed and active aspects of their

behaviours that all justifications for origins, repression, and motives become a primary element of analysis (Napolin, 2020).

However, a person with anxiety is obsessed with instances of sustained repetition because they possess understandable and normal intentions to prevent the anxiety by enacting defense mechanisms but have irregular capacities to intentionally forget and dissociate (Taškale & Šima, 2020). Consequently, anxious people act peculiarly but with repetitions deemed necessary for their treatment. Psychologists and therapists must, therefore, first reflect on people's behaviours as expressions of subjectivity and not merely focus on repressions and repetitions to appreciate neurotics (Karolia & Manley, 2020).

Primacy of anxiety over repression

The departure point with psychoanalysis is considering repression as an intentional action because it is inclusively where the possibility of intention prevails as a person pursues motivations and reasons (Morgan, 2021). With a focus on such perspective, Fanon and Heidegger insist that society and psyche structures are determined primarily by people's repression, even though repression is a result of anxiety. Accordingly, the main thing is the constant ego and its anxiety attitude that sets repression (Lau, 2021). Therefore, a person's anxiety never emanates from their repressed libido. Fanon finds that other than automatic anxiety, some anxieties function as signals of danger. Automatic anxiety is involuntary, while other anxieties stand for themselves and are intentional. People frequently overlook some key anxiety phase that involves the anxiety arising without knowledge of the actual thing a person is frightened of. This free-floating anxiety is unattached to ideas and an old discovery (Gerlach & Gloster, 2020).

Therefore, repressing the libido as Freud argues, does not generate energy to produce anxiety nor will anything else be considered the actual cause of such anxiety in financial terms. Instead, it is the "nothing" itself which "begets" anxiety or even amounts to it. Anxiety is the actual cause of people's madness (Zwiebel, 2020). Fanon maintains that when an unpleasant thing happens to a person, or they do something that impacts their neurosis, the person interpolates intervals wherein nothing must occur further. More importantly, instead of framing within the confines of private psychology as Freud intended with the neurosis concept, Fanon uses the neurosis idea to make a social psychology phenomenon entrenched in specific political and historical contexts of people colonisation (Schuller et al., 2020). Freud says that if people are in pursuit of neurotic disturbance causes or treatment means, they must continuously focus on the individual's past childhood. In citing Freud, Fanon stated that people hardly search for single events or causes of symptoms because anxiety emanates from repeated, frequent, or multiple traumas and analogous (Fanon, 1986). People endeavour to expel anxiety and traumas from their conscious minds to save their neurotics from excessive suffering (Judaken, 2020). It can be imagined that anxiety should never occur in the first place as a real event.

Fanon, therefore, differs from Freud's perspectives because while Fanon approves Freud's contentions that neurosis is based on infantile anxiety or trauma, Fanon suggests that such original anxiety and trauma is cultural and sharable and not simply or naturally individualistic and intrapsychic (Holzhey-Kunz, 2020). Unlike Heidegger and Freud, Fanon argues that foreign pressure environments comprise racism, oppression, and violence and that such cultural and material forms of anxiety can act as a cause of neurosis than Freud's inside fantasised foundations. For Fanon, the main foundation for racial neurosis is infantile anxiety and arises out of people's exposure to prejudiced values of oppressive foreign environments (Dillard, 2020). All the existentialism of Fanon, Freud, Heidegger's, and Sartre starts with a eudaemonist argument for authenticity to eventually affirm authenticity's categorial and ethical imperative (Tally, 2020).

Elementary existential insights that consider human existence require new categorisation that does not prevail in ancient conceptual repertoire or contemporary thought (Reed et al., 2021). Today, people cannot be held as constituents with static properties or subjects interrelating with a universe of objects. From an existential perspective,

understanding what people are is inadequate to knowing all truths that natural science and psychology science can tell. Therefore, people develop anxiety when events fail to trigger phobia in some other people (Farr et al., 2021). Anxiety means surrendering to “nothingness,” awful dread, and unbearably (Balogh et al., 2021). A limited world perspective results in a reduced world project and increased anxiety because the more a world is closer to an individual, the easier they get out of it. Whereas Freud’s Psychoanalysis theory embraces fear as the external motion and anxiety as the internal emotion or noxious incentive, Heidegger and Fanon’s existentialism holds fear as a particular life phenomenon and anxiety as a fundamental fact of people and life’s contingency, ungroundedness, and mortality (Alimohammadi et al., 2020). Heidegger, Freud, and Fanon differ in their perspective of anxiety because Psychoanalysis indicates anxiety arises out of intrapsychic conflicts. In contrast, theorists indicate that conflicts are between oneself and one’s feared emotions. The fear of jeopardising a fragile relationship is itself anxiety (Babulal et al., 2020).

From an existential analytics viewpoint, anxiety is, therefore, the basic theme of people’s existence whose threat experiences remain commonly linked to material and physical life aspects (Carveth, 2021). A deeper analysis of Heidegger, Freud, and Fanon perspectives indicates that anxiety entails the pursuit of supporting and foundational structures for people’s existence. Anxiety occurs when a person loses their sense of shelter and security or is in a universe that hardly offers definitive security (Steele, 2021). Therefore, anxiety is the subjective limit for feeling endangered in existential constructions. Fanon holds existence as the preceding essence as no internal persons within any person ultimately define them. Untainted nothingness prevails when a person removes the layers. A person is a transitive movement or project wherein self-fulfilment is a futural endeavour of consciousness realising itself (Chhabra, 2021).

Freud offers numerous approaches where the psyche is disjointed within itself or mapping out different areas according to several different standpoints. In contrast to Fanon and Heidegger, Freud shows that it is in the ego and id discourse that people find comparable characteristics in an essentialist proposition. Freud maintains that this is predominantly apparent in how his psychoanalytic theory decreases individual motivations to desire universal constructions like the Oedipus Complex (Spencer, 2020). To resolve coincidence moments and divide differences, there is a need to analyse the tensions between Freud’s fascination with people’s past and the existentialist focus on people’s future (Solms, 2021). Fanon and Heidegger agree with Freud that a choice has never been made or retained and filed decisions that depend on the past (Mandal, 2021).

Therefore, anxiety is the natural body process short of which people cannot survive as a species (Benning et al., 2020). Fanon and Heidegger illustrate that even though there was an evolution in Freud’s appreciation of the process of change and its nature, the central premise to Freud’s theory of anxiety and thinking is that people’s changes comprise awareness of own unconscious desires and instinctual instincts, as well as learning to manage the desires and instincts in a reflective, mature, and rational fashion (Fakhrkonandeh & Sümbül, 2021). Freud, Fanon, and Heidegger find that people, therefore, have deluded themselves from justifications for their behaviours that such self-deception is limiting their choices and resulting in increased anxiety. People increase their available choices after becoming conscious of their unconscious desires and defenses against them. Therefore, people assume greater extents of agency when they reduce the degree to which they are motivated by their unconscious features like anxiety (Moodley & Lee, 2020).

Fanon, Freud, and Heidegger insist that without essentially confronting any fundamental causes of anxiety, the effect of anxiety on a person’s life is restricted because such a person has not learned to handle or overcome the anxiety and meet their own needs (Grecucci et al., 2020). Fanon, Freud, and Heidegger indicate that today’s treatment of anxiety is unavoidably resulting in despair and depression unless

people pursue freedom, violence and/or change of behaviour so that the person can independently accomplish their desires and needs in the future (Kolber, 2020; Varley, 2021; Varma, 2021). Therefore, existential reasoning or thinking allows effective understanding as well as resolution of anxiety by requiring individuals to admit that the labelling of anxiety as a disorder or illness and/or something treatable or removable, separates anxiety from the person’s existential struggles (Adams et al., 2020).

Freud, Fanon, and Heidegger indicated that the resolution of anxiety needs to go past the ordinary and abstract understanding of the human mind to address the entire being, not as some chemically rebalanced machine but as possessing spiritual, social, and psychological needs (Cohen & Kaplan, 2020; Berry et al., 2021). The goal in managing anxiety is not avoidance or doing away with the anxiety because a) people cannot completely survive without it but are capable of living with it as much as possible, and b) the inevitable existential anxiety continues to prevail without the neurotic anxiety and people’s capacity to tolerate and confront (Pitman & Knauss, 2020; Fakhrkonandeh & Sümbül, 2021). Anxiety highlights disconnections between the future individual and the current perceived person. The most efficient approach to closing such disconnection is for the person with anxiety to seek freedom, that is, admit their obligation for their life situations and reach constructive choices to advance it (Benning et al., 2020; Panu, 2020). Freud, Fanon, and Heidegger argue that people are their own choices. They need the responsibility and tools to fashion authentic existences of purpose and meaning through their freedom of choice.

II. CONVERGENCE OF THREE THEORIES

The paper analysed anxiety from the perspectives of Frantz Fanon, Sigmund Freud, and Martin Heidegger. Fanon, Freud, and Heidegger agree that the tenure ‘object’ amounts to fragmentation or limited work, not several ontological dislocations or displacements. In terms of people’s anxiety, an object means a radically representative work of people’s racialisation, existent only if a person is confined to discourse or racialisation experiences (Meagher, 2021). The paper concludes that anxiety signifies dissemination, an explosion and abyssal outcome of irregularities in meanings, structures, and words. According to Freud, where society defines transference as the most primeval kind of people emotionally tied to the ‘object’, Fanon’s analysis of ‘black neurosis’ indicates re-conception of transference as the imaginary relationship to the image wherein blackness is artificial and masked already (Miller, 2020).

While Fanon and Heidegger offer a combined account of meaning’s human scope and the concealed ontological dimensions, Freud uses bodily being to account for concealed conditions that serve both presuppositions and conditions of the very scope of meaning (Carveth, 2021). The scopes are a complete and unified account of people’s conditions. Therefore, Freud, Fanon, and Heidegger establish a link between people’s mental functionality and physical disorder, stating that a corrupt mind results in actual physical indicators that harshly restrict the capability to function in this world properly (Balogh et al., 2021).

The three theorists acknowledge the prevalence of people’s unconsciousness over their consciousness by the operational dynamics of meaning even where Fanon and Freud perceived anxiety as a making of people unconsciousness, and Heidegger held anxiety as the making of people’s mental functioning and experiences. Whereas the existential phenomenology of Heidegger and Fanon criticised metapsychology by Freud, they all agreed on the rawness of Freud’s theory (Rumelili, 2020). Freud mistakenly employed a scientific tactic on people’s anxieties that assumed a thing-ontology restricting inquiries into existence in a mechanistic structure. Knafo (2022) indicates that Freud compounded the error by extending the perspectives beyond virtuous scientific reasons to non-verifiable theories like unconsciousness, instincts, and psychical energies. In essence, Fanon and Heidegger asseverated that under existentialism, one could not, like Freud, reify a person’s mind,

suggest divisions between the external world and self, body, and mind, hold unknowable both the internal self and external world, endeavour to close the opening with illusions like unconscious instinctual and psychical energies and also contend that this is a satisfactory explanation of people reality (Budziszewska & Jonsson, 2021). Such a claim by Freud fails on philosophical and scientific grounds because in creating some unknowable unconsciousness as a source of human operations, Freud condemns people to determinism with catastrophic results of preventing genuine possibilities of freedom (Ramírez et al., 2021).

The three theorists eventually argued that there is an indissoluble link between the object and subject (person), the enviroing world, and human awareness. In principle, one must treat a person's anxiety and ego as attached to their surroundings by opening the person with anxiety to the amusing totality of their experiences (Rumelili, 2021). Fanon, therefore, adopted Freud's psychoanalytic perspectives on consciousness and Heidegger's phenomenological perspectives of Being to a materialist and dialectical analysis of anxiety and the imposing world. Heidegger, Freud, and Fanon offer outstanding perspectives on liberation from personal anxieties through the exclusive use of existentialism, psychoanalysis, and dialectics to impose oppressive situations like anxiety or interventionism. The unprecedented hypothetical pastiche of the three theories offers a basis for the seminal liberationist ideologies in the psychology of education.

Freud, Heidegger, and Fanon poise that eradicating anxiety, inequities of oppression, and prejudice is only through people's struggles for freedom and equality, mainly through the political and ontological awakening of the individual, as well as breaking intellectual enslavement. As a result, people suffering from anxiety need a free-thinking consciousness to create a liberated society. Freud, Heidegger, and Fanon indicate that shortages in self-creation of new kinds of existence (Being) or identity transformation defeat any radical transformations of the existing social structure. Freud, Heidegger, and Fanon contend that anxiety patients and psychologists must drop defining as persecutory care the use of hysterical suggestions and hysteria because such guarantees misrecognition amongst people of individual realities. The three theorists advocate for some hysteric-revolutionary handling of people's anxiety as efforts to find an assertion of authority and analysis of revolution as hysterical occurrences. Contraction of a person with anxiety as a mortified person with very muscular rigidity and stiffness is vital to anxiety and 'hysteria', which Freud and Fanon hold as the defining anxiety symptoms. Marked by ideologies of a prejudiced referent image, words capture anxious persons as petrification of language, speech, desire, and dream by which the anxious person undertakes hysterical ambitions.

Heidegger and Fanon, therefore, adopted recommendations by Freud to develop their existential examination of a patient or student suffering from anxiety. Heidegger and Fanon insist that existentialism enables psychotherapists to understand better all meaning in Freud's endorsements for psychoanalytic treatment. Existential philosophies or perspectives hold the mind (consciousness) as a reference to intentionality and not something intending an object. People's consciousness prevails as the actual intention. Therefore, Fanon and Heidegger's existentialist-phenomenological psychology maintains that people's conscious phenomena and intentional actions are all anxiety, and psychoanalysis is focused on and not the non-referring and nonintentional phenomena of the world of objects. Fanon and Heidegger hold that the determination of desires support of people by an object as the properties require psychoanalysis by Freud to be founded on denial to consider a person as able of analysis and reduction to initial gifts.

III. CONCLUSION

This paper establishes that while for Heidegger and Freud, anxiety means the natural indicator of a person living their authentic lifecycle, aware of their living and mortality towards their death with conviction

and purpose, Fanon perceives anxiety as something all individuals inevitably experience as part of the actual reactions to everyday life challenges. Heidegger, Fanon, and Freud's perspectives of anxiety define anxiety as freedom's dizziness, that is, people learning to ultimately and correctly live with their anxieties. Anxiety is, therefore, unavoidable because it arises out of people's efforts to challenge themselves. Heidegger, Freud, and Fanon endeavour to distinguish clearly between existential, neurotic, and normal anxiety to indicate that the misdiagnosis of "normal" anxiety as a disorder result in current concerns and people's irresponsibility in actions and choices. Misdiagnosing anxiety authenticates anxiety as anything past a person's control and illness in need of treatment or complete removal. The misdiagnosis gives credibility to the victim's mentality by encouraging them to simply take anxiety pills and dampen the signs without resolving the actual causes. Anxiety misdiagnosis separates the person from the anxiety in their mind. Yet, such detachment of the person from the actual cause abrogates their obligation and capacity to handle the anxiety themselves.

This paper implicated to the field of psychology of education that everybody experiences anxiety as stimuli from the world, which is intelligible solely through some abstract structure. One must appreciate that to overcome or avoid anxiety irritations, people's existence (Being) must exist as a passive receiver of all irritations from acts and nature at the most elementary level (Clough et al., 2021). The most basic features of people's thinking or psyche involve discharging irritations, overcoming anxiety, and attaining pleasure. Therefore, the paper recommends that psychologists in education and people with anxiety should understand that appreciating the inner stimuli as disturbing some basic and inherent equilibrium state in a person helps appreciate responses to anxiety stimuli. Freud defines the equilibrium as a constancy principle. It is only against constancy, a sort of stasis in movement or momentum, that irritation can appear (Bassiri & Senie, 2020; Ansermet et al., 2020). Anxiety pushes a person into seeking self-organisation processing of the world to fit in with their current society or organisation. The subjectivity of people is characteristic of undoing or shortages in deprived relative integration levels.

The other implication is that Heidegger holds dread and anxiety as a foreboding feeling that awakens a person's fears of the obvious (known), like death, and the uncertain (unknown), like the exact time of death. Freud and Fanon capture a recurring aspect of dehumanisation that occurs by repetition. Consequently, a complete necessity for liberated self-consciousness in creating liberated societies is essential because no fundamental identity transformations prevail without the struggles of radical transformation in the social order. The other implication of this paper is that the main task for psychoanalytics is sorting out the guilt arising from actual and destructive people's imagination and societal crimes, including magical thinking, destructive wishes, fantasy, or feelings. Psychoanalysts currently think people must only have guilty feelings for damaging acts but not destructive, hostile feelings and thoughts. However, even though people's guilt from their actions seems essential, people with anxiety cannot evade accountability for their destructive and hostile wishes and feelings. People cannot embrace good feelings about themselves when full of resentment, hate, and envy. Therefore, the paper recommends that part of therapeutic tasks in today's psychology of education should involve helping a student, teacher, or any other person transcend as well as transform creatively the destructiveness into creativity, love, and gratitude.

IV. CONFLICT OF INTEREST

There are no conflicts of interest in this article.

V. DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data are available upon request.

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